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As technology scales down, the likelihood of hardware errors that
silently corrupt the results of applications is increasing. Evaluating the re-
silience of applications against hardware errors is thus of significant concern.
Current evaluation techniques via error injection are either low-fidelity or inef-
ficient in terms of using computing resources. This dissertation demonstrates
that sophisticated integration of injectors across abstraction layers and novel
sampling algorithms can significantly improve both the fidelity and efficiency.
Specifically, this dissertation describes an open-source instruction-level error
injector that generates high-fidelity hardware errors due to particle strikes
and voltage droops. Two acceleration techniques, nested Monte Carlo and
Injection-Point Overprovisioning, are proposed to speed up error injection
campaigns by 1 − 2 orders of magnitude. This dissertation also answers the
question of when high-fidelity is needed to evaluate the impact of hardware
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Due to technology scaling and the need of energy efficiency, hardware
is increasingly susceptible to various run-time fault sources that may lead to
errors, which corrupt architectural state. However, the impact of hardware
errors on applications varies. Some errors have no impact on some applica-
tions, some lead to system crashes, and others, which are known as silent-data
corruptions (SDC), silently corrupt the results of applications. Hence, under-
standing the application-level effects of hardware errors is crucial for evaluating
the reliability of computer systems.
The error-injection Monte Carlo methodology is widely used to quantify
the impact of hardware errors on applications and the effectiveness of detectors
designed to catch errors. This methodology requires thousands of application
runs for sufficient accuracy. Each run injects one error by perturbing the
state at some level of the system (e.g., the transistor level, the gate level, the
micro-architectural level, the instruction level, or the application level) and
then application-level impact is observed. The statistically expected impact is
1Part of this chapter appears in [1]. The author of this dissertation is the main contributor
of the idea, implementation, and evaluation. The other coauthors in [1] assist development
of the idea and implementation.
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derived by analyzing injection results.
As compute resources are limited, to obtain results in a reasonable
amount of time, researchers heavily rely on instruction-level error injection. It
models errors by corrupting an instruction of the application under test. Com-
pared with low-level injection (e.g., injecting to flip-flops at the gate level) that
requires significant compute resources for hardware simulation, instruction-
level injection is faster by five orders of magnitude [2].
However, existing instruction-level injection methodologies have a mod-
eling fidelity problem. Ideally, the way that instructions are corrupted should
match the effects of actual hardware errors. Errors generated at the gate level
are high-fidelity as they are close to realistic hardware errors. In contrast, as
shown later in this dissertation, existing error models at the instruction level
(e.g., randomly flipping a bit of an operand) are low-fidelity because they do
not take operand values into account.
This dissertation demonstrates that it is possible to use high-fidelity er-
rors, which model particle strikes and voltage droops, at the instruction level
and still maintain the higher injection speed of prior tools. The key enablers
are hierarchical injection and novel sampling algorithms. Hierarchical injec-
tion combines a faster high-level injector with another detailed injector that
is launched on demand to generate high-fidelity errors. The novel sampling
algorithms accelerate the entire injection process by 1−2 orders of magnitude
while keeping sampling quality equal.
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The aforementioned error injection framework and acceleration tech-
niques are bundled into the Hamartia hardware error analysis suite2 that is
open-source and available to the resilience community. Hamartia enables rapid
evaluation of software-based error detectors against realistic hardware errors.
This research conducts case studies to evaluate the effectiveness of compiler-
level and application-level error detectors at mitigating SDCs.
1.1 Research Goals
A desirable instruction-level error injector should generate high-fidelity
error patterns to model various hardware errors without impacting the effi-
ciency of reliability evaluation. Since existing injectors are either low-fidelity
or inefficient, this dissertation develops a high-fidelity instruction-level error in-
jection methodology along with novel acceleration techniques in order to meet
the following goals and obtain new insights (e.g., understanding the effects of
fidelity on experimental results).
High-fidelity error injection: Existing instruction-level injectors commonly
rely on simple error models (e.g., single-bit flips) even though it is already
known that such low-fidelity models do not match error patterns in actual
hardware [3, 4, 2]. An ideal injector should generate error patterns that are
as close to realistic hardware errors as possible.
Rapid resilience evaluation: Evaluating the resilience of applications using
2Available at https://lph.ece.utexas.edu/users/hamartia
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low-fidelity models is already time-consuming and requires significant compute
resource (thousands of core-hours per application). Improving error fidelity
must not exacerbate the evaluation overhead. Furthermore, as applications
and software-based error detectors are evolving rapidly, the error injection
methodology should be fast enough to keep up with them.
Open-source evaluation framework: Modern hardware development heav-
ily relies on proprietary tools and so does detailed error injection methodology.
Ideally, the parallelism of error injection experiments should not be artificially
limited by the number of tool licenses. It is thus beneficial to have a resilience
evaluation framework that is independent of proprietary tools and publicly
available to the community. In addition, open sourcing makes scientific results
reproducible and expedites the development of novel research ideas.
Comprehensive error modeling: Transient hardware errors result from
various run-time fault sources, each having distinct impact at the system
level. Existing instruction-level injectors assume particle strikes as the error
model [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 1], though researchers have pointed out that circuit timing
uncertainty also poses challenges for low-power system reliability [10, 11, 12].
It is desirable for an injector to encompass as many error models as possible
for evaluating different types of errors.
4
Table 1.1: Open-Source Error Injectors.
Injection High Acceleration Beyond
Level Fidelity Techniques Particle Strikes Platform
LLFI [13] LLVM IR LLVM
KULFI [14] LLVM IR LLVM
P-FSEFI [6] Emulation QEMU
gem5-Approxilyzer [15] Micro-arch X x86
FAIL* [16] Micro-arch, binary x86, ARM
PERSim [17] Gate level X X OpenRISC (FPGA)
Chiffre [18] Gate level X RISC-V (FPGA)
Hamartia Gate level, binary X X X x86
1.2 Current Approaches
Current resilience studies employ hierarchical injection to enhance error
fidelity with low overhead and error pruning to accelerate instruction-level
error injection. However, none of the existing open-source tools meet the
above goals simultaneously (Table 1.1).
1.2.1 Hierarchical Injection
Although low-level error injection (e.g., at the gate level) leads to high
error modeling fidelity, it is too slow to obtain results in a timely manner (five
orders of magnitude slower than instruction-level injection [2]). To strike a
balance between injection speed and fidelity, previous work proposes hierar-
chical injection where a faster injector invokes another detailed injector just
in time [19, 20, 21, 22]. However, using hierarchical injection alone is not
fast enough because many injected errors are masked within hardware with-
out affecting the software layers, which significantly increases the number of
Monte Carlo trials and the total evaluation time. This research introduces
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new acceleration techniques to speed up resilience evaluation.
1.2.2 Error Pruning
Several acceleration techniques are proposed to prune error-injection
paths that are unimportant [23, 24, 25]. However, they are only applicable
when errors propagate to the micro-architectural level or to the instruction
level. As described later in this research, many hardware errors are masked at
the circuit level or the gate level without corrupting architectural state. Thus,
additional techniques orthogonal to error pruning are needed for high-fidelity
error injection.
1.3 New Approaches in This Dissertation
This dissertation not only adopts hierarchical injection to enhance error
fidelity but also proposes two novel sampling algorithms to accelerate high-
fidelity error injection at the instruction level. The general idea of these new
algorithms is to save evaluation time by embedding multiple Monte Carlo
trials per application run while keeping sampling quality equal. In addition
to high-fidelity error models for particle strikes, this research also develops
high-fidelity error models for voltage droops. All of these error models and
acceleration techniques are bundled within an open-source resilience evaluation
suite named Hamartia,3 which meets the above design goals.
3Hamartia means to err in Greek.
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Key discoveries from evaluation include: (1) without detectors, single-
bit flips are a good approximation of high-fidelity errors resulting from particle
strikes, (2) existing low-fidelity error models do not represent errors caused by
voltage droops, and (3) software-based detectors can effectively detect errors
caused by particle strikes but not voltage droops.
1.4 Contributions
To summarize, the objectives of this research are: (1) increasing error
modeling fidelity, (2) reducing the number of application runs while keeping
sampling quality equal, and (3) evaluating the effects of modeling fidelity on
experimental results. This work makes the following contributions:
• This research develops Hamartia, an open-source hardware error analysis
suite with high fidelity and low overhead.
• This research enhances Hamartia’s modeling fidelity for particle strikes
and voltage droops.
• This research introduces two novel sampling algorithms, nested Monte
Carlo and injection-point overprovisioning, which speed up error injec-
tion by 1− 2 orders of magnitude while keeping sampling quality equal.
• This research evaluates the impact of errors on applications and the
effectiveness of software-based error detectors at mitigating SDCs.
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1.5 Dissertation Structure
Chapter 2 reviews the basic concepts of hardware transient errors and
resilience evaluation techniques. Chapter 3 introduces Hamartia, an open-
source and high-fidelity error injection and detection suite used throughout this
research. Chapter 4 develops error models for particle strikes in tandem with
an acceleration technique called nested Monte Carlo. Chapter 5 proposes er-
ror models for voltage droops along with another acceleration technique called
injection-point overprovisioning. Chapter 6 evaluates the effectiveness of vari-
ous software-based error detection techniques using error models developed in
this research. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes this research and sheds light on




Before describing the contributions of this research, some fundamental
concepts are reviewed in this chapter. Section 2.1 introduces relevant termi-
nology and assumptions in this dissertation. Section 2.2 surveys the different
methodologies for resilience evaluation. Section 2.3 summarizes the simple yet
low-fidelity error models widely used in resilience studies at the instruction
level.
2.1 Hardware Faults and Errors in Computer Systems
This research denotes faults as physical events that affect hardware
components. If a fault eventually changes the architectural state, it becomes an
error. The focus is transient (soft) errors in particular since they are random
and transient in nature and thus hard to detect. In contrast, permanent
faults that frequently lead to errors are typically detected once they occur. As
modern computers usually protect memory with error checking and correcting
codes (ECC), this research focuses on transient errors resulting from faults in
arithmetic and logic units. Furthermore, this research is concerned with the
impact of errors, but not the rate of errors. This is because the fault rates for
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current technologies are well-studied [26, 27, 28, 29], and the fault rates for
future technologies are largely unknown.
2.1.1 Fault Mechanisms
This dissertation specifically discusses two types of fault mechanisms:
particle strikes and voltage droops. Both mechanisms are expected to occur
more frequently due to technology scaling and low-power design.
2.1.1.1 Particle Strikes
Energetic particles from the environment can interact with a sensitive
node in a micro-electronic device and cause electron-hole pairs that perturb
the state of the affected node until a new value is written. The major contrib-
utors are high-energy neutrons from cosmic rays [30]. Although these faulty
events rarely occur, modern processors are sensitive to particle strikes as they
contain billions of transistors. This is the fault mechanism assumed by most
prior work on instruction-level error injection [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 1]. Both mem-
ory components and combinational logic are susceptible to particle strikes.
Chapter 4 in particular discusses the modeling of particle strikes.
2.1.1.2 Voltage Droops
Voltage variations (or droops) include static IR drops and dynamic dI
dt
droops [10]. The former is the result of current (I) passes through resistance
(R) in the power distribution network. The latter is caused by abrupt changes
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in switching activity that induce transient changes to current and voltage.
As voltage fluctuates, circuits can experience timing violation and thus some
flip flops may latch a wrong value. Since the magnitude of IR drops are
static throughout the execution of applications, this dissertation focuses on dI
dt
droops.
Processors typically have pre-determined operating points (in terms of
clock frequency, supply voltage, and temperature) that are known to be safe.
Additionally, sufficient design margins (or guardbands) are added to account
for various variations in the field such as process, voltage, and temperature
variations, ensuring that the processor functions correctly even in the worst
cases. Prior work has shown that such guardbands account for about 18% of
total node power [31, 32].
A new design strategy known as better-than-worst-case (BTWC) de-
sign has emerged [33]. The rationale behind BTWC design is that in typical
scenarios the processor can run with reduced guardbands without generating
any errors, resulting in higher energy efficiency. As for non-typical cases, errors
are either avoided with error prediction [34, 31] or corrected with detection-
recovery mechanisms [35, 36, 37]. Avoidance-based BTWC design has its lim-
its and can still lead to errors. On the other hand, existing correction-based
BTWC designs conservatively correct all detected errors without exposing er-
rors to the software stacks. However, studies have shown that a variety of
applications are resilient to errors and suitable for more aggressive BTWC
design [38, 39]. For instance, exposing errors to applications can lead to sig-
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nificant energy savings (10% to 50%) at little accuracy cost [39]. Evaluating
the impact of voltage droops on applications can help identify applications or
code regions that are resilient to errors and lead to improvements for BTWC
design. Chapter 5 specifically discusses the modeling of voltage droops.
2.2 Reliability Evaluation Methodologies
In this section, existing resilience evaluation techniques are summa-
rized. Since much prior work assumes particle strikes as the fault model,
evaluation methodologies for particle strikes are described first, followed by
methodologies for evaluating voltage droops.
2.2.1 Hardware-Based Methodologies
An example methodology is beam testing, which exposes electronic de-
vices to a heavy-ion radiation environment in order to quantify the rate and the
impact of radiation effects on applications [40, 9]. This methodology is highly
accurate and offers high fidelity because real devices are used. The analogous
methodology for evaluating timing errors is directly undervolting or overclock-
ing commercial processors [41, 42, 43, 44]. Disadvantages of this methodology
include high cost, high experimental setup time, limited availability of testing
equipment, and an inability to precisely control the fault locations of interest.
Evaluating software detectors using this methodology is thus cumbersome.
Also, the results are specific to the devices under test. It is impractical for




Software is used to perform fault/error injection at various abstrac-
tion layers. These methods can target specific layers of interest with different
fault/error models. For instance, faults/errors can be injected into applica-
tions [9], the operating system [45, 46], the architecture level [5, 13, 8], the
micro-architecture level [47, 25], RTL gate level [19, 2, 1], etc. Software-based
methods are more flexible because the injection substrate is decoupled from
the fault/error models such that tools can be repurposed to model different
types of faults.
However, software-based methods have a fidelity problem because: (1)
they can only inject faults/errors into the layer(s) modeled by software, and
(2) the fault/error model assumed may differ from reality. As a result, prior
work adopts hierarchical injection to balance injection speed and accuracy by
integrating injectors at different levels [20, 19, 1]. The tool developed in this
research is of this type.
2.2.3 Monte Carlo Methods
Transient faults are assumed to occur randomly and uniformly during
execution because they depend on a large number of factors including the dy-
namics of the system and variations of the operating environment. To evaluate
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Figure 2.1: An example to show the inefficiency of simple random sampling.
(or sampling) is necessary because the error space is enormous.
2.2.3.1 Inefficiency of Simple Random Sampling
The conventional sampling algorithm known as simple random sampling
is embarrassingly parallel, yet is inefficient in terms of collecting errors that
are observable at the instruction level. Figure 2.1 shows an example of simple
random sampling in which each application run is provided with one random
fault injection point (a random dynamic instruction instance for instruction-
level error injection). Faults that are masked at the circuit level or the gate
level are marked in green, while errors that propagate to the instruction level
are in red. In this example, eight application runs end up collecting only
two observable errors. In reality, error injection experiments need to collect
thousands of errors for statistical significance. Note that the higher the fault
masking rate at the lower levels (i.e., beneath the instruction level), the more
Monte Carlo trials are needed, which significantly increases evaluation time
and enormously wastes resources. To reduce the number of application runs
required for error injection campaigns, two novel acceleration techniques are
proposed in this dissertation.
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2.3 Current Error Models
Existing error models used at the instruction level are low-fidelity in
general to allow rapid evaluation. This dissertation compares the impact of
high-fidelity error models developed in this research with the current models
summarized below.
2.3.1 Random Bit-Flipping
This type of models corrupts the instruction affected by a particle strike
by flipping bits of an operand randomly. Single-bit flips are widely used in prior
work because of their simplicity. The fidelity loss of single-bit flips results from
the fact that particle strikes can corrupt multiple bits at the architectural level
in a complex and application-dependent manner (discussed in Chapter 4).
2.3.2 Previous Value
This model is used by prior work to model the effect of voltage
droops [39]. It assumes that when a droop occurs, all output pins of the
affected circuit experience timing violation and thus latch the output value
of the previous instruction using the same execution unit. The fidelity loss
results from the fact that the impact of voltage droops on instructions is de-




This model replaces the value of an instruction operand with a random
value, possibly mimicking the worst-case errors. The fidelity loss results from




In order to increase error modeling fidelity, to reduce the number of
runs while keeping sampling quality equal, and to evaluate the effects of fi-
delity on experimental results, this chapter introduces the Hamartia tool and
the methodology for experiments. Section 3.1 describes Hamartia, an open-
source tool for hardware error analysis.1 Section 3.2 presents the common
experimental setup used in this research.
3.1 Hamartia: An Open-Source Error Injection and De-
tection Suite
Section 3.1.1 motivates the creation of Hamartia. Section 3.1.2 de-
scribes the error injection and analysis flow. Section 3.1.3 introduces the key
features of Hamartia. Section 3.1.4 describes the implementation details.
3.1.1 Motivation
Need for high-fidelity error models at the instruction level: Sim-
ple error models (e.g., single-bit flips) are currently used in resilience studies
1Available at https://lph.ece.utexas.edu/users/hamartia
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at the instruction level and higher levels. On the other hand, prior work
that evaluates the impact of high-fidelity errors on applications either does
not model value dependency (i.e., error patterns are fixed across applications
[48, 39, 49, 50]) or relies on special hardware platforms such as FPGAs [48, 2].
As shown later in this research, the impact of particle strikes and voltage
droops on an application is determined by the values of the affected instruc-
tion(s). Since the number of FPGAs can artificially limit the parallelism of
error injection experiments, it is thus desirable to model value dependency and
to be able to perform resilience analysis on a general-purpose computer.
Need for low-overhead evaluation for high-fidelity errors: It is already
time-consuming to perform error injection at the instruction level, let alone
enhance error fidelity. Hamartia incorporates two novel acceleration techniques
enabling high-fidelity error injection with low overhead.
Need for unified interface for instruction-level error injection: The
resilience community lacks a common, shared interface for instruction-level er-
ror injection. Currently, error models and detector models have to be reimple-
mented for new projects. Hamartia addresses this issue by creating a shared
interface which allows existing instruction-level injectors to integrate high-
fidelity error models developed in this research and in the future.
Need for hassle-free error injection at scale: To take advantage of
the embarrassingly-parallel property of the Monte Carlo method, error in-
jection experiments need to be conducted on large-scale systems. Hamartia
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is equipped with a set of scripts which automatically submit error injection
experiments to the job scheduler of a large-scale system. Hamartia is an all-in-
one suite that allows high-fidelity and low-overhead error analysis at scale. The
design of Hamartia adopts modern software engineering practices for portabil-
ity, extensibility, and usability.
3.1.2 Error Injection and Analysis Flow
The overall injection flow of Hamartia consists of three phases: profiling,
injection, and analysis. As explained in Section 2.2.3, transient errors are
assumed to affect each instruction with equal likelihood for modeling uniform-
random particle strike times and dynamic variations in digital circuits. The
profiling phase is used for this purpose and derives the upper bound of dynamic
instructions in the program. The injection phase uses the Monte Carlo method
to evaluate the impact of errors at the application level. In each Monte Carlo
trial, the injector chooses a random instruction instance (based on the profile),
injects an error into that instruction, and logs the behavior of the affected
application. The analysis phase classifies the injection result for each Monte
Carlo trial and generates a reliability report, which includes statistics such as
SDC ratios and visualization results for further analysis.
3.1.3 Features
High-fidelity, low-overhead injection at the binary level: Hamartia
performs error injection at the binary level because it results in the most ac-
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curate results for instruction-level error injection. High-fidelity errors are gen-
erated with hierarchical injection. Overheads incurred by error injection are
minimized through the novel sampling algorithms introduced in this research
and other acceleration features of the underlying dynamic binary instrumen-
tation tool (Section 3.1.4.1).
Error models and detector models: Hamartia implements a plethora of
error models, including simple ones introduced in Section 2.3 and high-fidelity
error models for particle strikes (Chapter 4) and voltage droops (Chapter 5).
Additionally, several detector models such as arithmetic residual checkers [51,
52] are included.
Automatic injection and analysis pipeline: Hamartia takes only one
input from the user: an error configuration file which specifies the binary of the
application under test, the error model, and the detector model (if any). Error
injection experiments are automatically submitted to the job scheduler. Once
results are ready, Hamartia runs user-specified analysis scripts and generates
a report.
Reusable and extensible design: The core of Hamartia is an Application
Programming Interface (API) which allows error models and detector models
to be used by other injectors even written in different languages.2 Object-
oriented programming is widely adopted in the design of Hamartia for better
manageability and extensibility.
2Hamartia currently supports C++ and Python.
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3.1.4 Implementation
For high error fidelity, Hamartia adopts hierarchical injection in which
an instruction-level injector invokes a specific RTL gate-level injector at a spe-
cific instruction instance.3 The RTL gate-level injector performs just-in-time
fault simulation at the register-transfer level with input from the instruction-
level injector. An error context API enables communication between the
instruction-level injector and the gate-level injector.
3.1.4.1 Instruction-Level Injectors
The implementation of the instruction-level injector is based on Pin,
a dynamic binary instrumentation tool [53], which allows modification to the
architectural state of a dynamically-instrumented x86 application at runtime.4
Pin (and dynamic binary instrumentation in general) is selected for
the following reasons: (a) it is much faster than micro-architecture-level sim-
ulation and lower-level injectors since instrumentation can be disabled after
the injection point to run at native speed, (b) it is more accurate than com-
piler IR-level injectors [8], and (c) it allows injection into specific binary and
source code regions. Using Pin, it is still possible to map injected instructions
back to the program source lines (i.e., directly pointing out which lines are
problematic).5
3The invoked injector depends on the error model specified in the error configuration.
4Although the Pin-based implementation limits the usage to x86 platforms, the frame-
work itself can be easily generalized to the others.
5The application needs to be compiled with debugging information.
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The design of the instruction-level injectors are object-oriented. The
base injector is able to inject a single-bit flip to the output operand of a random
instruction instance (as in prior work). Developers can inherit the base injector
to develop new injectors. For instance, two injectors are implemented in this
research to model particle strikes and voltage droops, respectively.
3.1.4.2 The Error Context API
One of the main challenges of integrating an RTL gate-level injector
with a higher-level injector is software compatibility across abstraction layers.
To solve the compatibility problem, a generic error context API is designed to
carry essential information regarding a dynamic instruction instance. Some of
the crucial components are: (1) instruction type, which can be used to select
the target circuit for fault injection at the gate level, (2) input operands,
which are used to drive the circuit, (3) the error-free output operands, which
can be used to determine if an injected fault propagates to the ouptut of the
circuit (necessary for the acceleration techniques proposed in this research),
and (4) potentially corrupted output operands, which are filled by the gate-
level injector and might be the same as the error-free output if the injected
fault is masked.
3.1.4.3 RTL Gate-Level Injectors
The gate-level injector performs just-in-time fault simulation based on
the error context built by the instruction-level injector. There are two gate-
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level injectors developed in this research: one models transient faults due to
particle strikes and the other models faults due to voltage droops. The details
are presented in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5, respectively. When the just-in-
time fault simulation finishes, the gate-level injector updates the potentially-
corrupted output operands in the error context and returns the context to the
instruction-level injector.
Each RTL gate-level injector is wrapped into a set of Python mod-
ules. The actual simulation is done by Icarus Verilog, an open-source Ver-
ilog simulation tool [54]. With the cross-language error context API, gate-
level injectors can be easily integrated with other instruction-level injectors as
well [14, 13, 6, 55, 56].
3.2 Experimental Setup
This section explains how the application-level injection outcomes are
classified and the testbed on which the experiments are conducted in this
research.
3.2.1 Injection Outcome Classification
Unless otherwise noted, the analysis phase classifies all injection out-
comes into three primary categories:
• Masked: the injected error is masked by application, with output iden-
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tical or similar to the error-free run.6
• Detected Uncorrectable Error (DUE): errors that crash or hang
the program are categorized as DUEcrsh. Errors that result in obviously
erroneous application output (e.g., output is not finite or mismatch in
matrix size) are also in this category and denoted as DUEtest.
• Silent Data Corruption (SDC): the program ends normally with
output errors that are hard to detect.
3.2.2 Testbed
A machine that runs OpenSUSE 42.3 on an Intel i5-6500 CPU with
16GB DRAM is used to develop tools and techniques proposed in this research.
Once functionality is verified, error injection experiments are deployed on the
Lonestar5 supercomputer at TACC (Texas Advanced Computing Center).
6The error tolerance of output is application-dependent.
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Chapter 4
Error Models for Particle Strikes and
Acceleration with Nested Monte Carlo1
This chapter develops high-fidelity error models for particle strikes
along with an acceleration technique called nested Monte Carlo which speeds
up evaluation by orders of magnitude. Section 4.1 describes the background
and motivation of developing high-fidelity models. Section 4.2 presents the
design of the high-fidelity injector for particle strikes in Hamartia. Section 4.3
introduces the nested Monte Carlo technique. Section 4.4 and Section 4.5
compare the results of error injection using high-fidelity errors vs. current
low-fidelity ones.
4.1 Background and Motivation
Section 4.1.1 describes the propagation of transient (soft) errors due to
particle strikes within digital circuits. Section 4.1.2 explains the modeling gap
between existing simple error models and realistic soft errors. Section 4.1.3
shows the error patterns of realistic errors at the instruction level to motivate
1Part of this chapter appears in [1, 57]. The author of this dissertation is the main
contributor of the idea, implementation, and evaluation. The other coauthors in [1, 57]
assist development of the idea and implementation.
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the need for high-fidelity models for particle strikes.
4.1.1 Fault Propagation and Masking
Soft errors that affect storage elements and combinational logic are trig-
gered by random radiation events such as particle strikes. Only those strikes
that are energetic enough can potentially lead to data corruption; otherwise,
they are said to be electrically masked. When a strong particle strike hits a
memory component (e.g., latches and flip-flops), the data is corrupted until
new data is written into the component. On the other hand, if a logic gate
is hit, a transient pulse known as a single-event transient is created. If the
faulty signal (i.e., the single-event transient or the corrupted data signal from
a memory component) reaches the next latching window, erroneous data can
be written into a latch. The propagation process continues and might eventu-
ally corrupt data in architectural components such as the register file. At this
point, the fault manifests as an error.
This research assumes that faults escape electrical masking and timing
masking; that is, considered are particle strikes that carry sufficient charge
and result in faulty signals that arrive on time at the next latch. However,
logical masking is modeled (e.g., the faulty signal enters an AND gate with
the other input being 0) because it depends not only on the circuit but also
on the application. In other words, recall that this research is concerned with
the impact of errors, but not the rate of errors (Section 2.1). Also, the focus is
soft errors that affect execution units of the processor because errors occurring
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Figure 4.1: Particle strikes that are not modeled by high-level error injection.
within those circuits directly affect application data and thus more likely lead
to SDC. The same is assumed in previous work [13, 14, 58].
4.1.2 The Modeling Gap of Existing Error Models
Consider a fault that occurs at a random location within a circuit mod-
ule consisting of an input buffer, combinational logic, internal pipeline buffers,
and an output buffer (Figure 4.1). Since the goal is to inject errors, this work
assumes the circuit has inputs and/or outputs associated with architectural
state (e.g., an ALU).
Note that soft errors can be grouped based on their initial fault site
within the circuit. First, consider the faults that occur at either the input
buffer or the output buffer. When a fault happens at the output buffer, it
directly manifests as an error. On the other hand, when a fault occurs in the
input buffer, it can be masked by the operation (e.g., erroneous bits are shifted
out). Such errors can be modeled by bit flips because they either directly affect
the output or logical masking can be modeled by running the operation with
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erroneous inputs. These soft errors are already modeled in previous work via
injecting errors into instruction operands [5, 13, 59, 60, 61, 8].
Next, consider the case where the fault site is at either a logic gate
within combinational logic or internal pipeline buffers. Here the assumption
is that the fault induces a pulse that flips the output of the affected unit.
Although this faulty signal may be masked logically before propagating to
output buffer, it is possible that it leads to a soft error that corrupts multiple
bits of the output buffer. Because the exact impact of the soft error on the
output buffer depends on the initial fault site, the circuit, and the input data
vector, there is no corresponding simple architecture-level modeling for soft
errors originating from these internal circuit nodes. These errors are termed
hidden soft errors in this chapter. To quantify the impact of this modeling gap,
gate-level fault injection is performed to study characteristics of these hidden
soft errors. This gate-level injection is also called RTL injection because the
register-transfer level (RTL) description of a circuit specifies the circuit’s gates
and latches.
4.1.3 Characterization of Hidden Soft Errors
Figure 4.2 shows the distribution of how many bits in the circuit output
buffer are flipped if a fault from a circuit internal node is not logically-masked.
On average, 78% of errors manifest as single-bit flips. Hence, the single-bit flip
model does not accurately reflect 22% of errors, and these errors potentially


























Figure 4.2: Distribution of bit-flip count at circuit output with RTL-level
particle-strike model.




































Figure 4.3: Correlations between bit-flip positions with RTL-level injection.
Breakdown into two applications (LULESH and MG) and two circuits (64-bit
floating-point adder and multiplier). Axes denote bit locations of circuit out-
puts.
applications since logical masking depends on circuit input.
Modeling multi-bit errors is challenging because of correlations between
bit-flip positions at a circuit’s output (Figure 4.3). First, correlations vary
across circuits because the circuit’s structure determines its logic operations,
which in turn affect logical masking. Second, correlations are related to input
data. For example, using input data from LULESH, the floating-point adder
has strong correlations between bits in the exponent field (bit 52-62), while
such phenomena are not observed with input from MG. This is because log-
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ical masking depends on input data. Hence, not only do correlations vary
across circuits, they also depend on input data and thus on applications. Such
complex and data-dependent correlation is not modeled by existing random
bit-flipping models.
Although realistic error patterns are different from single-bit errors
at the instruction level, the impact on applications is still unknown due to
application-level error masking. Thus, it is necessary to perform error in-
jection to evaluate the end-to-end effects of hardware faults on applications.
Next, the design of a high-fidelity instruction-level for modeling particle strikes
is introduced.
4.2 A High-Fidelity Error Injector for Particle Strikes
The injector is developed on top of Hamartia introduced in Chapter 3.
It is based on the same architecture for hierarchical injection, consisting of an
instruction-level injector and a gate-level injector.
The instruction-level injector: The role of the instruction-level injector is
to build the error context for the target instruction (Section 3.1.4), pass the
error context to the gate-level injector, and then change the architectural state
of the application based on the modified error context returned by the gate-
level injector. Since the base instruction-level injector already implements the
functionality of injecting a random dynamic instruction, the implementation of
the instruction-level injector simply inherits the base injector without changes.
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The gate-level injector: To model particle strikes at the gate level with
low overhead, the implementation is split into two stages: pre-processing and
runtime. In the pre-processing stage, an additional gate is inserted at each
node of the circuit by modifying the RTL source code with Pyverilog [62].
For instance, to model a particle strike that flips a node’s value, the circuit
is augmented with XOR gates, each of which has one input connecting to an
existing node and the other input as a trigger signal.2 Note that the pre-
processing stage is an one-time effort and is totally transparent to the end
users.
The runtime stage consists of several steps. First, the tool selects a
pre-processed circuit based on the instruction type in the error context. For
instance, if the target instruction is an integer ADD, then a pre-processed
integer adder is fetched. Next, gate-level simulation is performed using the
circuit and the values of input operands in the error context. The tool ran-
domly triggers an XOR gate (by setting its trigger signal to 1) to emulate a
fault. Finally, the output of the circuit is written into the error context as the
new output operands of the target instruction, and the error context is sent
back to the instruction-level injector to modify the architectural state of the
application.
Note that due to logical masking, the output of the circuit may still be
2The tool also supports modeling of stuck-at-0 and stuck-at-1 (by inserting AND gates
and OR gates), but they are not evaluated in this research because the focus is transient
errors instead of permanent errors.
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̶̶ ̶̶ Nested Monte Carlo̶̶ ̶̶ Simple random sampling
Figure 4.4: Error injection flow: Nested Monte Carlo vs. simple random sam-
pling.
the same as the error-free operation, and thus the fault has no impact at the
instruction level. The next section introduces a novel technique to increase
the likelihood of generating realistic errors that propagate to the instruction
level to accelerate evaluation.
4.3 Nested Monte Carlo
As explained in Section 2.2.3.1, the traditional simple random sampling
is not efficient in terms of evaluating high-fidelity errors at the instruction level
due to fault masking at lower levels. This section introduces a refined hierar-
chical injection methodology to boost error injection by orders of magnitude.
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The error injection flow for simple random sampling is depicted in Fig-
ure 4.4. Note that the pre-injection and post-injection stages account for
the majority of overheads (>95%). As a result, the idea is to use a form of
nested Monte Carlo methodology. The outer portion follows the traditional
instruction-level error injection campaign described in Section 3.1.2. How-
ever, within each Monte Carlo trial a nested Monte Carlo is performed at the
gate level. In each outer iteration, the correct instruction (arithmetic circuit)
output is first logged and then, a single random fault is repeatedly and im-
mediately injected at the gate level until a fault manifests as an error that
corrupts the output. By doing so, only an actual error that has not been log-
ically masked is injected into the outer Monte Carlo trial, saving significant
time by avoiding complete application runs when the outcome has already
been determined. This novel injection flow is also shown in Figure 4.4, which
also shows how the methodology is extended to include detectors.
Evaluation using simple random sampling is even worse when error de-
tectors are introduced. Numerous Monte Carlo runs and RTL gate-level fault
injections are necessary to generate faults that truly affect the application be-
cause good error detectors have high coverage and detect most errors that are
not logically masked. As a result, faults are generated iteratively at the RTL
level to filtering out detected errors. That is, errors that would be detected
should also be pruned since the injection outcome is known at this point (de-
tected). Thus, fault injection is repeated until an undetected error is generated
to save time. Otherwise, similar to the cases of masked faults at the RTL level,
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it is wasteful to restart the application for other injection points.
This filtering notion can be extended to resilience techniques at differ-
ent abstraction layers by cascading error detectors starting from fine granu-
larity to coarse granularity. For instance, only errors that are not detected
by instruction-level hardware detectors are sent to fine-grained software state-
recovery mechanisms [63]. Note that the longer the detector chain, the greater
the savings that can be achieved.
An important aspect of this nested Monte Carlo methodology is that it
requires multiple faults that propagate to actual errors to be identified in order
to establish statistical bounds on the logical fault-masking rates for different
instructions and applications. In that way one trial at the outer level is indeed
equivalent to a flat methodology for the purpose of evaluating the logical mask-
ing rate and detector coverage. Note that a limit on injection attempts needs
to be set to avoid practically infinite loop when the masking rate of the circuit
is high. The selection of the limit can affect the tradeoff between evaluation
time and accuracy. While the nested algorithm provides the same statistics as
a traditional Monte Carlo, the specific instructions to which actual errors are
injected will differ from a traditional injection campaign where each trial ran-
domly selects an instruction. This nested methodology is fully equivalent to a
traditional campaign despite this potential difference. The validation results
are shown in Section 4.5.1.
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4.4 Evaluation Methodology
The evaluation consists of six main parts: (a) verifying the proposed
nested Monte Carlo methodology, (b) evaluating the benefits of nested Monte
Carlo, (c) evaluating the impact of the error model on the reliability of ap-
plications, (d) evaluating the impact of error detection on the reliability and
error types of applications, (e) evaluating the impact of the error model on
application output quality in the context of HPC scientific applications, and
(f) evaluating the impact of the error model on the overhead of an overall
resilience scheme (specifically, checkpoint-restart).
Before discussing the evaluation results, this section describes the error
models, the detector models, and the applications studied in this work.
4.4.1 Detector Models
To study the impact of hardware detectors on application resilience,
arithmetic residue checkers are chosen. They are shown to provide high cov-
erage for errors from execution units with relatively low cost [51, 52], and
are also adopted by commodity processors (e.g., POWER6 [64]) and previous
work on hardware resilience design [65, 66].
Residue checkers detect errors by comparing output of the arithmetic
unit with that of a relatively low-cost datapath. The checking can be de-
scribed by Equation 4.1 where ⊕ denotes integer addition, subtraction, or
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multiplication and |x|m denotes x mod m.
|a⊕ b|m
?
= | (|a|m ⊕ |b|m) |m (4.1)
It is assumed that no errors affect the final equality checker, so these
residue checkers have perfect coverage for single-bit datapath errors. Specifi-
cally, implementations include a residue checker with modulus 3 and another
with two moduli, 3 and 5. The latter provides higher coverage because an
error is not detected only when both checks fail.
4.4.2 Error Models
Assume on-chip SRAM and system DRAM are protected by ECC and
only inject errors to instructions using arithmetic and logic units. In each
experiment, an error is injected into a random instruction’s output operand
with one of the four error models below.
• Single-bit flip (RB1): randomly flips a single bit, as commonly done
in prior work in the HPC community.
• Double-bit flip (RB2): randomly flips two bits.
• Random (RND): replaces the output with a random value, possibly
mimicking worst-case errors.
• RTL gate-level model (RTL): generates an error pattern using the
methodology described in Section 4.2. RTL-G and RTL-L are used to
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denote injection into gates only and latches only, respectively; latch in-
jection is only done for pipelined floating-point units.
• model+: uses model on a design with a single-modulus residue checker
where model is one of the error model described above.
• model++: resembles model+ but with a double-modulus residue
checker (i.e., stronger detection).
For the RTL model, gate-level netlists of integer and floating-point
execution units are synthesized using Synopsys tools (Design Compiler and
DesignWare Library) with the 45nm Nangate Open Cell Library, optimized
for performance. Because the DesignWare Library does not include pipelined
floating-point units, the register retiming feature of Design Compiler is used
to pipeline the circuits. The pipeline stages are tuned to mimic those used
by Intel Broadwell processors based on the latency data from [67]. Table 4.1
lists the circuits used in this work. Note that the synthesized circuits can be
different from those designed and optimized for commodity processors, but
this work has shown that they lead to errors different from single-bit errors at
the instruction level.
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Table 4.1: Circuits used in the RTL error model, their pipeline stages, and the
fault-masking probabilities of injecting a logic gate and a latch, respectively.
The reported masking rates are averages of all applications in this work.
Name Stages Gate Masking Rate Latch Masking Rate
INT add sub 1 0.17±0.02 n/a
INT mult 1 0.09±0.05 n/a
Shift 1 0.30±0.08 n/a
FP add sub 3 0.28±0.03 0.27±0.04
FP mult 3 0.41±0.02 0.33±0.02
FP div 10 0.49±0.09 0.54±0.12
FP sqrt 1 0.46±0.10 n/a
4.4.3 Benchmarks and Output Quality
Evaluation is based on the serial version of 9 HPC benchmark programs
and applications (Table 4.2).3 For each application, 3000 injection experiments
are performed, which ensures a margin of error <2% for a confidence level of
95% [68], on 10 combinations of error models and detector models. Injection
outcomes are classified into three categories as in Section 3.2.1. Table 4.3 lists
the output quality for each application. The same metric shipped with the
application or suggested by previous work are adopted [69, 70].
3A more resilient IS is used in which an assertion is inserted at the end of randlc() to
check if the output falls within [0, 1].
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Table 4.2: Benchmark, input, and injection overhead per experiment.
Program Input Native Time Simple Time RTL Time RTL+ Time RTL++ Time
FFT [71] -m 16 0.01s 1.3s 1.7s 5.2s 19.1s
miniFE [72] nx=18 ny=16 nz=16 0.04s 2.1s 6.0s 8.1s 12.1s
LU cb [71] default 0.04s 1.2s 1.8s 4.8s 11.2s
IS [73] A 1.2s 3.0s 4.6s 7.4s 21.3s
CG [73] A 1.2s 7.1s 7.8s 8.8s 10.9s
MG [73] A 1.5s 11.9s 15.0s 18.0s 51.7s
CoMD [74] default 5.7s 28.5s 29.1s 32.2s 52.4s
LULESH [75] default 22.1s 103.7s 109.7s 112.3s 121.9s
XSBench [76] small 30.9s 91.7s 92.5s 93.4s 96.3s
Table 4.3: Benchmark output quality metric.
Program Quality Metric DUEtest Criteria
FFT [71] Rel-L2-Norm Infinite values
miniFE [72] Resid-Norm Resid-Norm > 1
LU cb [71] MaxAbsDiff Infinite values
IS [73] n/a Failed verification
CG [73] Zeta Infinite values
MG [73] L2-Norm L2-Norm > 1
CoMD [74] Potential energy Lost atoms, infinite energy, or potential energy > 0
LULESH [75] Measure of symmetry (MaxAbsDiff) [69]
XSBench [76] n/a n/a
4.5 Experimental Results
4.5.1 Validation of Nested Monte Carlo
To validate the statistical equivalence between the nested Monte Carlo
and simple random sampling, the outcome distributions of each methodol-
ogy are compared (Figure 4.5). Notice that any differences between the
two methodologies, for all experiments we conducted with RTL injections are
within the 95% confidence intervals of each experiment. In other words, the
specific numbers obtained are not identical, but the 95% confidence intervals
of the two methodologies overlap. Note that the nested approach has narrower
(better) confidence intervals for a given number of trials because each outer
Monte Carlo trial identifies multiple non-masked errors in the inner stage.
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Figure 4.5: Validation of nested Monte Carlo against simple random samping
in terms of outcome distributions. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.
Evaluation of output quality shows similar statistical equivalence.
Note that there is a pitfall when comparing the RTL error injection
results of nested Monte Carlo with simple random sampling: the proportion
of each instruction type among the error samples is different between the two
methods because each circuit has different logical masking rate. Nested Monte
Carlo collects error samples following the instruction mix of the application
since fault injection is repeated until an error is generated for each experi-
ment, while simple random sampling collects more samples from circuits with
lower masking rate since the experiments end as soon as the injected fault is
masked. Thus, it is necessary to normalize the proportion of each instruction
type among the error samples before comparing the injection results. Such
normalization is performed in the aforementioned validation campaign.
Table 4.4 illustrates the normalization process. Suppose there are two
types of instructions in a program: ADD and MUL. The instruction mixes
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Table 4.4: Illustration of the normalization process for comparing simple ran-
dom sampling (SRS ) with nested Monte Carlo (NestedMC ).
ADD MUL Total
instruction type ratios SRS 0.2 0.8
I NestedMC 0.6 0.4
NestedMC/SRS 3.0 0.5
original outcome ratios Masked 0.2 0.4
II DUE 0.5 0.2
SDC 0.3 0.4
normalized outcome ratios Masked 0.6 0.2 0.23
III DUE 1.5 0.1 0.46
SDC 0.9 0.2 0.31
obtained using simple random sampling and nested Monte Carlo are shown
in region I. The original outcome distributions by instruction types measured
with simple random sampling are shown in region II. The normalization pro-
cess consists of two steps: (1) the outcome ratio of each instruction type is
multiplied with the NestedMC/SRS value, and (2) the outcome ratios are
summed across instruction types and then normalized. The last column in
region III shows the normalized outcome ratios (0.23, 0.46, 0.31 for Masked,
DUE, and SDC, respectively).
Observation 1: the nested Monte Carlo approach is equivalent to traditional
injection campaigns, despite significant potential benefits in execution time.
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4.5.2 Injector Overhead
Overhead of various error models in Hamartia: Table 4.2 compares
the execution time overheads of using the Hamartia injector with a simple
bit-flipping error model, RTL injection, and RTL injection with detectors,
to the time each application runs natively. Recall that instrumentation is
disabled after the injection point (Section 3.1.4.1), so the injector overhead
depends on the injection point (i.e., a dynamic instruction). Therefore, the
table reports the average injector overhead, which corresponds to injection at
the mid-point of program execution. Evaluation is performed on the testbed
system described in Section 3.2.2.
There are three interesting observations. First, very short-running ap-
plications, which require a fraction of a second to run natively, incur a sig-
nificant relative overhead for injection because starting up the Pin injector
and invoking the error model have a fixed overhead of 1− 2s. Second, longer
running applications incur a reasonable injection overhead with a slowdown of
3−5× without detectors and 5−10× with detectors, even when RTL injection
is used. This is because the relative time to bring up the injection infrastruc-
ture is small relative to the execution time of these applications. Third, the
overhead of RTL injection and detector evaluation varies between applications
because the masking factor and detector coverage are data dependent—the
higher the masking or coverage, the more iterations are required within the





























































Figure 4.6: (a) Speedup of Hamartia over PINFI with simple error models (RB1,
RB2, and RND) and the proposed RTL gate-level model. Error bars denote
maximum and minimum speedups. (b) Scaling of per-experiment execution
time as native time increases.
Overhead of Hamartia vs. the state-of-the-art: Figure 4.6(a) shows that
the overhead of Hamartia, even with RTL injection, is actually lower than
PINFI [13], which is one of the fastest injectors currently available. PINFI
is chosen because recent work has shown that it has lower overhead than
compiler-based injectors [8]. Hamartia outperforms PINFI even with RTL-
level injection, except for applications that can finish in under two seconds.
The performance loss is due to the additional features for injecting specific
binaries and instructions, but the overhead is amortized for larger applications.
On average, the injector developed in this research is faster than PINFI by a
factor of 3.
Since full-scale HPC applications have much longer execution times,
the tool’s execution time vs. problem size is shown in Figure 4.6(b). The
input size of LULESH is increased to mimic native execution time of larger HPC











































































































































































































Figure 4.7: Execution savings (relative to actual runs) by nested Monte Carlo
for RTL and injection-detection coupling. Left: RTL error model with residue
checkers. Right: Simple error models with residue checkers.
overhead of the Pin tool. When the problem size is large enough, the difference
in overhead between simple models and the RTL model is negligible (4.32X and
4.34X slowdown for simple and RTL model, respectively). The overhead can be
further reduced by taking checkpoints during the profiling phase and starting
each injection experiment at the checkpoint closest to the target injection point
as in [47].
Benefits of nested Monte Carlo: Next, the execution savings of the er-
ror injection experiments are measured for each application. The savings are
presented as the ratio of runs saved due to nested Monte Carlo:
∑N
n=1 itern×
dyninstn/total dyninst, where N is the number of injection experiments, itern
is the number of local iteration for the nth experiment, dyninstn is the dy-
namic instance number of the nth experiment, and total dyninst is the total
dynamic instructions of the application. This work assumes the overhead of
actual error injection at the injection site is small relative to the overhead of
pre-injection and post-injection period, which are true for all applications that
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are not very short. Figure 4.7 shows that the overall savings are larger when
the RTL model is used since the injector keeps injecting faults until one man-
ifests as an error. Also the savings increase with the strength of the detector
used. Note that LU cb has the highest savings due to most of the instructions
can be protected by the residue checkers (Table 4.5). In contrast, LULESH has
a small portion of instructions protected by residue checker but its savings at
the RTL level is significant because of the input data result in high logical
masking.
Observation 2: with the nested approach, the overhead of injection, even
when using detailed error models and high-coverage detectors, can be kept low
and roughly match that of current injectors with simple error models.
4.5.3 Reliability Outcome Distributions
RTL vs. simple error models: Figure 4.8 shows the outcome distribu-
tion of all combinations of error models without detectors. The most surpris-
ing result here is the small difference between RTL and RB1 for all appli-
cations. While the small confidence intervals demonstrate that the outcome
distribution is sometimes statistically different, the absolute difference is very
small. The largest difference in SDC ratios between the two models is only
4% (XSBench), and the difference in DUE ratios is also only 4% (CG). This
shows that even though the two models are quite different at the instruc-
tion level (Section 4.1.3), the impact on applications is likely unimportant
due to the large proportion of single-bit errors, correlated error patterns, and
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Figure 4.8: Injection outcome distributions (without detectors). Error bars are
95% confidence intervals.
application-level error masking. However, neither RB2 nor RND can closely
approximate the RTL model because of aggressive (uncorrelated) bit-flips in
these two models.
Gate soft error vs. latch soft error: Next, the impact of gate soft errors
(i.e., a logic gate output is flipped) vs. latch soft errors (i.e., the output of
a flip-flop is flipped) is studied. Results of six applications are reported here
because compiled binaries for the others do not use pipelined circuits. The
left of Figure 4.9 compares the distribution of bit-flip count at the instruction
level between gate and latch soft errors. Notice that latch soft errors have
more multi-bit patterns than gate soft errors. However, similar final impact
on application resilience is observed for both error types (right of Figure 4.9)
due to application-level error masking.
Observation 3: without detectors, RB1 is a good approximation of RTL in-
jection, whether experiencing gate or latch faults.
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Figure 4.9: Comparison of bit-flip count distribution at the instruction level
(left) and injection outcome distribution (right) between gate soft error and
latch soft error. Only floating-point instructions are injected here because they
are pipelined (i.e., having both gates and latches).
4.5.4 Impact of Hardware Residue Checkers
Coverage: Figure 4.10 shows the coverages (i.e., error detection rates) of the
checkers with different error models applied. First, coverage is application-
dependent when the RTL error model is used. The residue checker with a single
modulus can detect 88% of errors on average, while the coverage increases to
97% with two moduli. Second, when RB2 is used, the coverage of the single-
modulo checker is slightly application-independent, while that of the double-
modulus checker has larger variation across applications. Finally, when RND
is used, coverages of both detectors are nearly the same across applications
but significantly lower than RTL model.
Outcome distributions: The impact of residue checkers on final outcome
distribution is shown in Figure 4.11. The results only include the distribu-
tion of protected instructions (i.e., integer add/sub/mul instructions) so as to
decouple protection ratio from the result. To account for the fact that each
instruction is injected multiple times until an undetected error is generated,
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Figure 4.10: Coverage of residue checkers with different error models. Coverage
for RB1 (not shown) is always 100%. Error bars are 95% confidence intervals.


































































































































































































































Figure 4.11: Injection outcome distribution for instructions protected by residue
checkers (i.e., integer addition, subtraction, and multiplication operations). See
Section 4.4.2 for the definitions of error models and detector models.
and thus compute the distribution as following. First, four empty bins cor-
responding to each outcome category are created. Next, for each of the 3000
injection outcomes, it contributes ce to the DUEcrsh bin and (1 − ce) to the
outcome category of the undetected error where ce is the averaged detector
coverage of error model e in Figure 4.10. In the end, the outcome distribution
and confidence intervals are computed with data in the four bins.
Since residue checkers have perfect coverage for RB1 and good coverage
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for the RTL model, the RTL model has larger improvement in SDC ratio
compared with RB2 and RND. However, with the RTL model, the additional
improvement in SDC ratio by adding another modulus to the residue checker is
marginal because the coverage of the single-modulus residue checker is already
high (except for XSBench).
It is important to note that SDC improvement due to residue checkers
on all instructions is highly dependent on the protection ratio (Table 4.5).
For example, although SDC ratio is improved by nearly 9% for protected
instructions in MG, the actual SDC ratio improvement is only 2% as only 25%
of instructions are protected. The injection outcome results can guide the
adoption of software error detectors and how they should be tuned. When the
hardware detector can detect most critical errors such that the resultant SDC
ratio already meets the resilience target, the software detector is not necessary
and thus performance would not be degraded. On the other hand, the software
detector should be tuned to target those errors left by hardware detectors to
minimize impact on performance.
Observation 4: When detectors are introduced, the impact of the error model
is large when the fraction of instructions protected is also large.
4.5.5 Impact of Error Models and Detector Models on Application
Output Quality
Perturbed application output quality due to SDC: Previous work
demonstrates that reliability and output quality may be traded off (e.g., [77,
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Table 4.5: Ratio of dynamic instructions protected by residue checkers.
Program Ratio Program Ratio Program Ratio
FFT 0.78 miniFE 0.88 LU cb 0.99
IS 0.38 CG 0.59 MG 0.25
CoMD 0.35 LULESH 0.09 XSBench 0.65
70]). With a bounded degradation of quality, the cost of protecting the ap-
plication against soft errors can be reduced. Thus, the application output
qualities of SDC cases between error models are compared. Two methods
are used to objectively compare output quality degradation distributions from
different error models. First, comparison is based on the quality metric of
each SDC sample to the golden value to identify the most significant decimal
position of the outcome error. A histogram of these positions is computed for
each application and model. Then the histograms between each pairs of error
models are compared using the chi-squared test, which is widely used to test
the similarity of one set of binned data against another [78].
The second comparison method treats the perturbed quality of each
error model as a continuous random variable. Thus, for each error model,
the perturbed quality can be uniquely described as a cumulative distribution
function (CDF). To measure similarity between two CDFs of continuous data,
the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is used.
For both hypothesis tests, the null hypothesis H0 is no difference in
output quality between a pair of error models; the alternative hypothesis H1
is there is difference in output quality between error models. Thus, if the null
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Table 4.6: p-values of Chi-squared and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests for applica-
tion output quality between error models. Bold fonts represent output qualities
are significantly different.
Program
p-values (Chi-squared / Kolmogorov-Smirnov)
RTL vs. RB1 RTL vs. RB2 RTL vs. RND RTL+ vs. RB1+ RTL++ vs. RB1++
FFT 0.87 / 0.36 0.00 / 0.00 0.00 / 0.00 0.00 / 0.00 0.00 / 0.00
miniFE 0.77 / 0.99 0.03 / 0.01 0.06 / 0.09 0.00 / 0.00 0.00 / 0.00
CG 0.05 / 0.66 0.74 / 0.22 0.01 / 0.18 0.00 / 0.16 0.21 / 0.50
MG 0.76 / 0.32 0.23 / 0.51 0.10 / 0.60 0.95 / 0.76 0.74 / 0.89
CoMD 0.74 / 0.69 0.38 / 0.49 0.00 / 0.45 0.15 / 0.04 0.91 / 0.33
LULESH 0.67 / 0.86 0.01 / 0.07 0.05 / 0.00 0.24 / 0.51 0.69 / 0.78
hypothesis is rejected, it indicates output quality differs significantly between
the pair of error models. The significance level (α) is chosen to be 0.05. As a
result, if the calculated p-value from a test is less than 0.05, the observed data
rejects the null hypothesis. The results of both tests are shown in Table 4.6.
Both tests show that there is no significant difference in output quality
between RB1 and RTL when there are no hardware residue checkers.4 How-
ever, neither RB2 nor RND result in similar output quality as RTL. When
residue checkers exist, the perturbed output quality of RTL is statistically dif-
ferent from bit-flipping models for applications in which the detectors protect
a reasonable fraction of instructions. This is because multi-bit errors gener-
ated with RTL model may not be detected by residue checkers and thus affect
the output quality.
Effective application output quality: So far this work only shows how
4These results do not mean that both RB1 and RTL lead to the same distributions of
output quality for these applications.
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error models and detector models affect application output quality given an
error always results in SDC. Nonetheless, the effective output quality actually
depends on SDC ratio and the coverage of the detector (if any). The effective
output quality can be computed as
(1− c) ∗ ((1− PSDC) ∗MeanerrFree + PSDC ∗MeanSDC)
+ c ∗ (MeanerrFree)
(4.2)
where c is detector coverage, PSDC the SDC ratio of the error model,
MeanerrFree the expected output without error, and MeanSDC the mean per-
turbed output due to SDC. Here detected errors contribute to MeanerrFree
because they can be corrected either by checkpoint-restart, or by restarting
the whole application from the beginning.
Using this metric, the findings are that: (1) both RB1 and RTL lead to
very similar effective output quality because their SDC ratios and MeanSDC
are similar, (2) residue checkers fail to improve effective quality of miniFE
and LULESH because the MeanSDC is significantly different from MeanerrFree,
and (3) the impact of error models on effective quality is negligible for the
applications whose effective quality is improved by the residue checkers (e.g.,
RND++ and RTL++ have similar effective quality for FFT, CG, MG, and CoMD).
Observation 5: While the specific output quality degradation of a specific
run with detectors requires a high-fidelity error model, the overall impact on





























Figure 4.12: Application efficiency due to checkpointing overhead vs. the ratio
of dump time to MTTF where alpha is the ratio of estimated MTTF to true
MTTF. This implies that slight estimation error of DUE ratios has negligible
impact on achieving minimal checkpointing overhead.
4.5.6 Impact of Error Models on Resilience Overhead
Recall that the DUE ratios obtained with RB1 and RTL are slightly
different (max difference is 4% for CG in Figure 4.8). With the DUE ratios
from error injection results, researchers can tune the checkpointing interval
for minimal overhead incurred by checkpointing and rollback. To quantify the
impact of tuning the checkpointing interval based on RB1 instead of the RTL
model, the application efficiency is derived (i.e., the fraction of time for real
computation as opposed to checkpointing) using the higher-order formula in
[79, 80]. Note that the 4% difference of DUE ratios for CG (39.4% vs. 35.5%)
leads to around 10% estimation error of the mean time to failure (MTTF).
However, such difference has negligible impact on application efficiency (Fig-
ure 4.12). This is also true when the residue checkers are considered. The
maximal difference of the DUE ratios between RB1 and RTL with detectors
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is XSBench (100% for RB1+ vs. 90.5% for RTL+), which also leads to 10%
estimation error for MTTF. Thus, tuning the workload-specific checkpointing
interval through single-bit error injection is good enough.
Observation 6: RB1 is sufficient for evaluating the overall performance effi-
ciency impact of errors (on checkpoint-restart) whether detectors are used or
not.
4.6 Summary
This chapter develops high-fidelity error models for particle strikes
along with an acceleration technique called nested Monte Carlo which speeds
up evaluation by orders of magnitude. By demonstrating the outcome dis-
tributions, application output quality, and the impact on checkpointing over-
head, single-bit errors remain a good approximation of realistic soft errors from
arithmetic and logic circuits when hardware detectors are not considered. If
hardware detectors are known to exist, a more realistic error model should be
used to evaluate and tune the software resilience techniques.
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Chapter 5
Error Models for Voltage Droops and
Acceleration with Injection-Point
Overprovisioning1
This chapter develops high-fidelity error models for voltage droops
along with an acceleration technique called injection-point overprovisioning
that speeds up evaluation by an order of magnitude. Section 5.1 describes
the background of voltage droops and motivation of developing high-fidelity
models. Section 5.2 presents the design of the high-fidelity injector for voltage
droops in Hamartia. Section 5.3 introduces the injection-point overprovision-
ing technique. Section 5.4 and Section 5.5 compare the results of error injection
using high-fidelity errors vs. current low-fidelity ones.
5.1 Background and Motivation
Section 5.1.1 describes the propagation of timing errors caused by volt-
age droops within digital circuits. Section 5.1.2 explains the impact of timing
errors on modern computer systems. Section 5.1.3 discusses the capabilities of
1Part of this chapter appears in [81]. The author of this dissertation is the main con-
tributor of the idea, implementation, and evaluation. The other coauthors in [81] assist
evaluation of the idea.
55
existing timing error models.
As defined in Section 2.1, faults denote physical events that affect hard-
ware components. If a fault eventually changes architectural state, it becomes
an error.
5.1.1 Timing Errors in Digital Circuits
Timing faults result from variations in supply voltage, temperature, or
device characteristics that change circuit timing. As a result, some inputs may
take too long to propagate through the circuit and lead to an error when a
corresponding output flip-flop latches a not-yet-stable value. In a sequential
circuit, a timing fault manifests as a timing error when at least one flip-flop
latches an incorrect value and it eventually perturbs architectural state. This
process is complicated because it depends on the variation’s magnitude and
duration, the circuit, its operating condition (including clock frequency, volt-
age, temperature, etc.), and the sequence of input values to the circuit; both
current inputs and previous inputs are important. This work targets timing
errors as a result of voltage droops.
Although the circuit structure determines the delay of each path, in-
put values control which paths are toggled (or sensitized). For example, in
Figure 5.1, given the input pair, it is the red path that determines the timing
of the endpoint E1, while the other paths are false paths because their tim-
ing is irrelevant given the inputs. Only variations that are strong enough can






















Figure 5.1: An example timing error caused by a voltage droop.
diate values) are latched by flip-flops at the circuit endpoints. However, old
values are not always different from the correct values. As a result, whether
an instruction is affected by a timing fault depends on the input history of the
circuit as well (i.e., circuit inputs at previous cycle).
Whether faults become errors also depends on logical masking. For in-
stance, in Figure 5.1, even though the flip-flop of E1 fails to latch the new
value produced by gate G2, the fault only affects the output of G4 but not
G5 in the subsequent stage. This is because the other input to G5 is a con-
trolling value (in this case, 0). Thus, high-fidelity modeling of timing errors in
pipelined circuits needs to consider logical masking as well.
Timing errors may affect multiple instructions and corrupt multiple
bits in output operands. For instance, consider variations that persist across
multiple cycles or those that impact multiple pipeline stages simultaneously.
Note that this is different from radiation-induced errors, which usually affect
a single instruction. For a detailed discussion of timing errors, see [10, 12].
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5.1.2 Impact of Timing Errors on Computer Systems
Modern systems apply substantial voltage and/or frequency guard-
bands in hardware to ensure that timing errors never occur, even at the worst
operating condition. However, guardbands waste energy and performance be-
cause typical use cases do not lead to timing errors. Prior work has shown
that such guardbands can account for about 18% of total node power for IBM
POWER7 [31] and ARMv8 systems [32].
Researchers have been advocating cross-layer techniques to over-
come the power constraints of future systems without expensive guardband-
ing [82, 12, 83]. Nonetheless, due to dynamic variations (e.g., voltage droops
and temperature fluctuations) and shared power delivery networks in many-
core processors [84, 85, 12], the likelihood that timing errors occur in large-
scale systems may become non-negligible. Technologies such as near-threshold
voltage computing are even more susceptible to timing errors [86]. Thus, a
methodology to evaluate the resilience of applications against timing errors is
highly desirable.
5.1.3 Existing Timing Error Models
Table 5.1 summarizes prior work on modeling timing errors. Features
of a high-fidelity error model include whether it is value-dependent, whether
it models logical masking for pipelining, and whether the operating condition
is tunable. Since no prior work is comprehensive, this research develops high-
fidelity timing error models available to the research community.
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Table 5.1: Prior work on timing error modeling.
Publicly Value Logical Frequency Voltage Temperature Process
Available Dependent Masking Tunable Variation Variation Variation
SWAT-Sim [19] X X X
VARIUS-NTV [87] X X X X
CrashTest [48] X X X
b-HiVE [49] X X X
CLIM [88] X X
Constantins et al. [50] X X X
This work X X X X X X ∗
∗This is achievable by enhancing the underlying timing analysis tool with the capability of statistical timing analysis.
5.2 A High-Fidelity Error Injector for Voltage Droops
This injector is developed on top of Hamartia which was introduced
in Chapter 3. It is based on the same architecture for hierarchical injection,
consisting of an instruction-level injector and a gate-level injector to acceler-
ate injection and still generate high-fidelity errors. At the injection point, the
instruction-level injector provides the gate-level injector with: (1) the instruc-
tion type (used to determine which circuit to simulate) and (2) a pair of input
vectors to the circuit for the previous and current cycle. A user-provided error
configuration supplies the voltage droop profile (i.e., magnitude and duration).
The gate-level timing error injector then returns a potentially corrupted out-
put to the instruction-level injector. Figure 5.2 shows the overall flow of the
timing error injector.
5.2.1 The Instruction-Level Injector
As mentioned in Section 5.1.1, the manifestation of a timing error




































Gate-Level Timing Error Injector
Binary
Figure 5.2: Instruction-level timing error injector for a pipeline of depth D.
Each timing fault injector is the per-stage injector in Figure 5.4.
instruction-level injector is to collect the data necessary for reproducing cir-
cuit state. The workflow of the injector is explained with the example in Fig-
ure 5.3. The instruction instances affected by a timing fault are called victim
instructions. Specifically, the injector logs: (1) input pairs, which are input
operands of victim instructions and those of the previous instructions that
utilized the same circuit and (2) instruction types of those instructions (e.g.,
ADD, MUL, etc.). For the example in Figure 5.3, the input pair is ((r1,r2),
(r4,r5)) and the instruction type is floating-point addition. These data are
used to build the error context which is passed to the gate-level injector along













Figure 5.3: Example binary snippet and error configuration.
5.2.2 The Gate-Level Injector
This injector produces the potentially corrupted output operand for
each victim instruction. The core consists of a fault driver and multiple timing
fault injectors. Each fault injector models temporal masking in one pipeline
stage. The fault driver prepares inputs for the fault injectors which are chained
to model logical masking across stages.
5.2.2.1 The Fault Driver
Based on the instruction type, it first looks up the circuit database to
determine the circuit used by the victim instruction. If the circuit’s pipeline
depth is D, then D fault injectors are chained together. Next, the driver
prepares input for each fault injector. It decides the operating condition of the
circuit based on the error configuration. It also generates fault-enable signals
to control whether a stage should be injected or not. These fault-enable signals
are determined based on the fault duration and pipeline occupancy (explained
in Section 5.4.1.1). Once all input to fault injectors are ready, the driver
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Previous 
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Figure 5.4: Per-stage timing fault injector.
For the example in Figure 5.3, the victim instruction uses the floating-
point adder, which has three pipeline stages in the evaluation of this research
(see Table 5.2). Therefore, three fault injectors are chained together. Since the
user specifies that the droop decreases the voltage to 0.85V, the driver fetches
the characterization corner for that voltage level from the cell library database.
Assuming the victim instruction is in the third stage when the single-cycle
droop occurs, only the fault-enable signal to the third stage should be set (i.e.,
the results of first two stages are error-free). Finally, the input pair, ((r1,r2),
(r4,r5)), is sent to the first stage and the simulation begins. The output of
the first stage becomes the input to the second stage, and so on. In the end,
the fault driver sends the potentially corrupted output of the last stage back
to the instruction-level injector, which modifies the value of r6 accordingly.
5.2.2.2 Modeling Temporal Masking
Figure 5.4 shows how to model temporal masking within each pipeline
stage. To this end, those endpoints (i.e., input of flip-flops or circuit’s output
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pin) experiencing a timing violation must be identified given the input pair to
the circuit and its operating condition. Dynamic timing analysis is performed
to determine which endpoints encounter a timing violation using the method
proposed by Cherupalli and Sartori [89]. The idea is to remove false paths
before running static timing analysis (STA) such that only paths with gates
toggled in the specific cycle determine signal arrival times at the endpoints
(e.g., the red path in Figure 5.1). The false paths are derived by parsing
the value change dump (VCD) generated by gate-level simulation. Although
the original evaluation in [89] uses a proprietary STA tool, this research uses
OpenTimer, an open-source STA tool [90]. For gate-level simulation, the open-
source Icarus Verilog simulator [54] is used.
Once the output pins encountering a timing violation, the error-free
output of the victim instruction, and error-free output of the previous in-
struction that used the same circuit are identified, the potentially corrupted
output operand for the victim instruction (the timing fault generator box in
Figure 5.4) can be derived. For example, if the error-free output of the victim
instruction is 0010, the output of previous instruction is 1111, and all bits ex-
cept the least-significant bit encounter a timing violation, then the corrupted
output operand is 1110.
5.2.2.3 Modeling Logical Masking
Logical masking is modeled by chaining fault injectors. If a fault is
injected at one stage, it may be logically masked by one of its following stages.
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Each pipelined circuit is preprocessed by splitting it into individual stages
using Pyverilog, a hardware design processing toolkit for Verilog HDL [62].
The functionality of the resultant circuits are verified to ensure that the circuit
transformation does not break functionality. This is a one-time procedure and
it is completely transparent to the user. At runtime, the fault driver provides
the circuit of each pipeline stage to each corresponding fault injector.
5.2.3 Limitations
This research makes two assumptions: (1) the magnitude of variations
is constant within each cycle, and (2) the execution order of instructions fol-
lows the program order. This is not always true for processors with out-of-
order execution, which require detailed modeling of their micro-architecture
for full fidelity. For such a study, the gate-level injector can be integrated with
injectors at the micro-architectural level [47, 25]. Metastability is not mod-
eled because the estimated mean time between metastability events (using the
models in [91]) is larger than 1040 years even for the worst operating condition
evaluated in this work.2 Although the evaluation focuses on timing errors as
a result of voltage droops, the tool can be used to evaluate timing faults due
to overclocking or temperature fluctuations as well.
2If the user specifies very small cycle time or very strong droop, the tool reports the
mean time between metastability events based on existing models and warns the user if the




This research assumes that timing faults occur randomly and uniformly
during execution because timing errors depend on a large number of factors
that include dynamics of the system and variations of the operating environ-
ment. To evaluate the resilience of applications against timing errors, the
Monte Carlo method is adopted because the error space is enormous. How-
ever, as explained in Section 2.2.3.1, it takes a large number of Monte Carlo
trials to collect statistics on errors that do affect applications. Although hier-
archical injection helps reduce per-trial evaluation time, the overall evaluation
is still slow because the number of trials remains large.
The nested Monte Carlo method proposed in Section 4.3 is not appli-
cable for injecting timing errors hierarchically. This is because particle strikes
usually affect only one component (or just a few components) in the circuit at
a time. If a fault is masked, nested Monte Carlo can inject a fault to another
component. On the other hand, timing errors affect many components in the
circuit simultaneously (all components that share the same power delivery net-
work in the cases of voltage droops). As a result, if a timing fault is masked,
there are no other sites to inject a fault into at the same instruction.
This dissertation introduces another novel sampling technique called
Injection-Point Overprovisioning. This technique is based on the observation
that masked faults do not change the architectural state (i.e., are invisible to
applications). Unlike simple random sampling which provides only one injec-
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Figure 5.5: The proposed injection-point overprovisioning technique vs. simple
random sampling. (a) simple random sampling, (b) injection-point overprovi-
sioning, and (c) an example of applying injection-point overprovisioning on two
cores in parallel. Green crosses denote masked faults and red ones are errors
that change the architectural state.
tiple potential injection points, sorted by injection time. If a fault is masked at
an early injection point, the next point is evaluated until an error is generated
or until all injection points for the run are exhausted. Once injection succeeds
in manifesting an architecturally-visible error, all remaining points are passed
to the next run to ensure that the sampling is unbiased.
Figure 5.5b illustrates the idea of injection-point overprovisioning with
the same set of injection points as shown in Figure 5.5a for simple random
sampling. Injection-point overprovisioning reduces the number of applications
runs from 8 to 2 in this example. Note that injection-point overprovisioning in-
creases the injection overhead per run because it performs multiple injections.
However, as long as the per-run injection overhead is negligible compared to
the overhead of running the application itself, the overall evaluation time will
be improved. An analytical model of the benefit is discussed later in this
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chapter.
Injection-point overprovisioning is easily generalized to machines with
parallel architectures and still reaches the same level of parallelism as simple
random sampling. Figure 5.5c shows an example of parallel overprovisioning on
two cores with the same set of injection points. Note that dependencies only
exist between application runs that execute back-to-back on the same core,
while runs on different cores are independent. A synchronization mechanism
among cores is needed to terminate the entire error injection campaign when it
collects enough errors to claim statistical significance, but this synchronization
is infrequent.
Implementation: This research demonstrates an example implementation of
injection-point overprovisioning with the master-worker parallel pattern. The
master thread is responsible for generating and updating the batch of injection
points associated with each core and for synchronizing worker threads upon
termination.
Recall that the overall injection flow of Hamartia consists of three
phases: profiling, injection, and analysis (Section 3.1.2). The profiling phase
simply determines the range of injection points, while the injection phase does
fault/error injection with the injection-point overprovisioning technique.
In the injection phase, the master thread initializes each batch with N
points randomly drawn within the range determined in the profiling phase.
It then launches a worker thread for each core that performs fault injection
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to the specified application. Next, each worker thread injects faults at points
specified in its batch until an error is generated or until the batch is exhausted,
and then records the remaining points (if any). When a worker thread on core
Ci is done, the master thread updates the batch associated with core Ci by
either passing the remaining points or generating a new batch of points. Once
the total number of collected errors reaches the target, the master thread waits
until all worker threads finish before terminating the injection phase.
The analysis phase examines the injection result for each application
run and generates statistics such as the injection outcome distributions. Note
that the efficiency of the proposed technique depends on the batch size N and
other factors.
Analytical Modeling: The goal is to understand when injection-point over-
provisioning outperforms simple random sampling. To this end, a first-order
analytical model for the cost of generating an error relative to application
execution time is derived.
Assume that at each injection point, the fault masking rate is an i.i.d.
Bernoulli random variable with masking-probability P . Let α be the injection
overhead normalized to the execution time of the application. The cost of using
simple random sampling is then formulated as in Equation 5.1. The first term
is the cost of injecting a fault for each application run and the second term is
the mean number of fault injections (equal to the number of application runs)
needed to generate an error. For instance, if P is 50%, it takes two runs on
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average to generate one error.




The cost of injection-point overprovisioning (with N points per run)
can be formulated as in Equation 5.2, based on the law of total probability.
The first term is the expected cost if the first injection leads to an error. The
expected relative cost of running until the injection point is 1
N
because the
injection points are generated uniformly across time. The second term is the
cost if the first injection is masked but the second injection results in an error,
and so on.
CIPO = (1− P )(
1
N
+ α) + P (1− P )( 2
N
+ 2α)











The speedup of overprovisioning is defined as the ratio of CSRS to
CIPO. If speedup is greater than 1, then injection-point overprovisioning out-
performs simple random sampling. Parameters are swept in both equations
and speedup is shown in Figure 5.6. When injection overhead is small (e.g.,
α ≤ 0.1), injection-point overprovisioning outperforms simple random sam-
pling by at least 4X in most cases, and speedup increases with the batch size
(N). However, when the masking ratio (P ) is less than 0.2, or when the injec-


































































Figure 5.6: Speedup (CSRS / CIPO) of injection-point overprovisioning as a
function of the batch size, the masking ratio, and injection overhead. X-axis is
the batch size (N), and y-axis the masking ratio (P ). α is the injection overhead
normalized to execution time of the application.
than simple random sampling.
In reality, the fault masking ratio depends on multiple factors (including
circuits, operating condition, input data, etc.). Thus, it is not as simple as a
Bernoulli random variable. Experimental results for the benefits of injection-
point overprovisioning are presented in Section 5.5.1.
Optimization with Checkpoint-Restart: Injection-point overprovisioning
can be further improved with the aid of low-overhead checkpoint-restart. The
idea is to reduce the overhead of running applications toward injection points
by fastforwarding to the nearest checkpoint before each injection point. Note
that this optimization helps only when the overhead of restarting is small
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compared to application execution time. The analysis is beyond the scope of
this research.
5.4 Evaluation Methodology
The evaluation consists of the following parts: (1) assessing the benefits
of injection-point overprovisioning, (2) characterizing the timing error models
at the instruction level, (3) evaluating the impact of error models on the re-
silience of applications, and (4) conducting sensitivity studies of application
resilience to droop profiles and pipeline occupancy.
5.4.1 Error Models
This research focuses on timing errors resulting from transient voltage
droops (i.e., dI
dt
droops), but the tool and framework can be used to study
other types of timing errors as well. However, the injector overhead would be
too high to evaluate faulty events with very long duration (e.g., temperature
variations can last milliseconds or longer, which requires simulating millions
of instructions at the gate level). The proposed high-fidelity error models that
use just-in-time error generation are compared to two well-known low-fidelity
error models.
5.4.1.1 High-Fidelity Timing Error Models
Recall that the error manifestation process of timing errors is very
complex and depends on the following factors: (1) the circuit structure, (2)
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Table 5.2: Circuits and their fault injection overhead.
INT-ADD INT-MUL FP-ADD FP-MUL FP-DIV
Pipeline Depth 1 3 3 3 1
Overhead Mean 0.39s 4.80s 1.59s 3.95s 4.15s
Overhead Std. 0.003 0.112 0.011 0.026 0.029
the operating condition, (3) the variation’s profile, and (4) the history of input
values to the circuit.
Circuits and Operating Conditions: The tool injects errors to arithmetic
units because those circuits are more prone to timing errors according to pre-
vious work [92, 93]. Gate-level netlists of integer and floating-point adders
and multipliers are synthesized using Synopsys tools (Design Compiler and
DesignWare Library) with Synopsys’s SAED 32nm technology, optimized for
performance. The pipeline depths are tuned to match Intel’s Broadwell pro-
cessors based on the latency data from [67]. OpenTimer is used to obtain
the critical path of each circuit and set the clock frequency as 400MHz. The
nominal voltage of the cell library is 1.05V and temperature is set to 25◦C.
Table 5.2 lists the circuits studied in this work. These circuits can be dif-
ferent from those designed and optimized for commodity processors, but the
developed tool is generic enough to evaluate other circuits as well.
Droop Profile: Other than the nominal 1.05V voltage, two other voltage
levels (0.85V and 0.78V) are used to model droops. Both single-cycle droops
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and multi-cycle droops that persist for the maximum pipeline depths (i.e., 3
cycles for the circuits under test) are modeled.
Pipeline Occupancy: The number of instructions affected by a voltage
droop depends on the droop’s duration and the occupancy of the affected
pipeline. In general, for a pipelined circuit of depth D, the maximal number
of instructions affected by a T -cycle droop is D+T −1. The extreme cases are
modeled to understand whether accurate modeling of pipeline occupancy is
necessary. A low-occupancy pipeline has only one instruction in the pipeline
throughout duration of the droop, while a high-occupancy pipeline is fully
utilized with each stage occupied by an instruction.
For each droop magnitude, the combination of droop duration and
pipeline occupancy leads to four error groups:
• Single-cycle Low-occupancy (SL): a single-cycle droop affects a low-
occupancy pipeline.
• Single-cycle High-occupancy (SH): a single-cycle droop affects a
high-occupancy pipeline.
• Multi-cycle Low-occupancy (ML): a multi-cycle droop affects a low-
occupancy pipeline.

































Figure 5.7: Illustration of error groups for a 3-stage pipeline. Data flow from
stage 1 (S1) to stage 3 (S3).
Figure 5.7 illustrates the four error groups for a 3-stage pipeline. In
this example, SL affects one instruction at a random stage. SH affects three
instructions simultaneously in one cycle. ML affects the same instruction in
three consecutive cycles at different stages. MH affects five instructions in total
across three cycles. For each instruction, the error group determines which
stages are affected by the droop. Recall that in the injector design, fault-enable
signals are used to control which stages to inject faults into (Figure 5.2). For
instance, when the ML error group is specified, I1 is affected by the multi-cycle
droop in three consecutive stages. Thus, fault-enable signals corresponding to
those stages are set.
To summarize, the error models are:
• Single-bit flip (RB1): randomly flips a single bit, shown to be a good
approximation of high-fidelity arithmetic errors due to particle strikes [1].
• Previous value (PREV): models a severe voltage droop which causes
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timing violation at all output pins and thus latches the output value of
the previous instruction using the same execution unit [39].
• Decreasing voltage to 0.85V (0.85V): generates a timing error re-
sulting from a droop that decreases the voltage to 0.85V. It consists
of four error groups with different combinations of droop duration and
pipeline occupancy (Figure 5.7).
• Decreasing voltage to 0.78V (0.78V): generates a timing error re-
sulting from a droop that decreases the voltage to 0.78V. It also consists
of four error groups.
5.4.1.2 Experimental Settings
This work assumes that timing faults occur randomly and uniformly
(e.g., when hardware error-mitigation techniques fail due to an unexpectedly
strong voltage droop). In each experiment, the tool injects an error into a
random instruction’s output operand with one of the four error models listed
above. For each model, injection-point overprovisioning is used to collect 2000
random errors. This ensures a margin of measurement error around 2.2% for
a confidence level of 95% [68]. Based on Figure 5.6, the batch size (N) is set
to 10. For SIMD instructions, the tool injects timing faults to all SIMD lanes
because they usually share the same power delivery network.
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Table 5.3: Benchmarks, their input, average execution time, and the criteria
to classify injection outcomes as SDCs.
Input Native Time Time w/ Injection SDC Criteria
FT Class A 3.5s 23.4s Failed verification
LU Class A 29.3s 201.8s Failed verification
MG Class B 5.8s 46.7s Failed verification
CG Class A 1.2s 7.6s Failed verification
CoMD default 5.7s 33.8s Potential energy > 10−10 [74]
LULESH default 22.1s 130.5s MaxAbsDiff > 10−8 [69]
5.4.2 Benchmarks
Six serial scientific kernels and proxy applications are used: FT and LU
and CG and MG from NPB [73], CoMD [74], and LULESH [75]. Table 5.3 sum-
marizes the benchmarks, their input, native execution time per experiment,
execution time with injection overhead, and how injection outcomes are classi-




Figure 5.8 shows the speedup of injection-point overprovisioning for dif-
ferent error groups under different droop magnitudes. The maximum speedup
is 7X (for LULESH in the setting with 0.85V and the SL error group). Speedup
is highest for the SL error group (i.e., voltage droop affects only one instruction
at a random stage). In this case, timing errors are more likely to be logically
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Figure 5.8: Speedup of injection-point overprovisioning for high-fidelity timing
error injection. Speedup here is defined as the ratio of evaluation time using
simple random sampling to injection-point overprovisioning. Left: 0.85V; Right:
0.78V. X-axis: four error groups (Figure 5.7).
masked at later pipeline stages, and thus the fault-masking rates are higher.
Also, speedup is higher when droop magnitude is lower (0.85V) because the
fault-masking rate is higher (mostly due to temporal masking). On average,
for the weaker droops (0.85V), speedup of injection-point overprovisioning is
4.7X, 2.2X, 2.2X, and 1.7X for the SL, ML, SH, and MH error groups, respec-
tively. For stronger droops (0.78V), speedup is 3.0X, 1.8X, 1.8X, and 1.6X,
respectively.
In terms of resource savings due to injection-point overprovisioning,
2,943 core-hours are saved for the entire evaluation. The original resource
requirement for simple random sampling was 5,585 core-hours. Notice that the
savings can be even higher if one needs higher accuracy (i.e., observing more
errors). The accuracy in this work is around 2%. The projected savings for a
1% accuracy target is 13,978 core-hours for the same set of experiments. The
resource requirement would be 26,527 core-hours if simple random sampling
is used.
77

















































































Figure 5.9: Distributions of the number of flipped bits at circuit output (simple
error models vs. the high-fidelity ML timing error group).
5.5.2 Injection Outcome and Analysis
In this section, presented are the characteristics of timing errors at the
instruction level and the injection outcome at the application level.
5.5.2.1 Instruction-Level Error Patterns
The characteristics of how many bits of the circuit output are flipped
(Figure 5.9) and which bits are more likely to be flipped (Figure 5.10) are
derived. Note that distributions are application-dependent.
According to Figure 5.9, timing errors flip multiple bits in most cases
(> 80%). The fact that timing errors tend to flip lower-significance bits is due
to value locality at the higher-significance bits. In other words, the higher-
significance bits rarely transition between previous output and current output
at the circuit level. Therefore, even though higher-significance bits are more
likely to experience timing violation, the latched values are still correct.
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Note that PREV in some cases (e.g., CG and LULESH) flips fewer bits
than the high-fidelity model. This is due to the fact that errors generated
by PREV exhibit a different instruction mix when compared with the high-
fidelity model; PREV essentially injects errors into some instructions that
never generate an error when using a higher-fidelity model. Although circuits
with lower complexity (e.g., integer adders) are less sensitive to timing errors,
PREV can still corrupt results generated by such simple circuits because it
lacks timing information.

























































































































































Figure 5.10: Distribution of bit-flip positions at circuit output with input from
each benchmark under the ML error group. Note that these are not distribu-
tions of positions with timing violation.
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Figure 5.11: Injection outcome distributions (simple error models vs. the high-
fidelity ML timing error group). Results of other error groups are in Figure 5.12.
5.5.2.2 Application-Level Impact
Figure 5.11 shows the distributions of error injection outcomes using
different error models. Recall that RB1 is shown to be a good approximation
of high-fidelity arithmetic errors due to particle strikes [1], and thus it can be
used as a proxy to compare timing errors with errors due to particle strikes.
Observation 2: timing errors rarely lead to DUEs.
Compared to RB1 and PREV, high-fidelity timing errors rarely lead to
DUEs. This observation is related to previous results at the instruction level:
lower-significance bits are more likely to be flipped. On the other hand, since
RB1 flips each bit with equal likelihood, it tend to flip higher-significance bits
and causes more segmentation faults. LULESH is the only application in which
high-fidelity timing errors result in some DUEs. It turns out that most DUEs
are bus errors (i.e., unaligned memory accesses) instead of segmentation faults.
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Observation 3: timing errors result in low SDC ratio.
High-fidelity errors cause fewer SDCs compared with RB1 and PREV.
This is also related to the results at the instruction level. For instance, for
floating-point instructions, flipping lower-significance bits leads to changes in
the significand field, which has less impact compared to the exponent field.
SDC ratios are expected to be even smaller for weaker droops (e.g., droops
that decreases the voltage to 0.9V). Comparing the SDC ratios between RB1
and high-fidelity timing errors, the maximum difference occurs in FT where
the SDC ratio of RB1 is 10% and those of 0.78V and 0.85V are 3% and 0%,
respectively.
Observation 2 and observation 3 indicate that it is plausible to save
power by reducing guardbands if the user can tolerate some DUEs and SDCs.
However, such decisions must be made carefully as timing errors can occur
when the processor is in kernel mode as well. The evaluation of kernel mode
is beyond the scope of this research.
Observation 4: neither RB1 nor PREV is a good approximation for high-
fidelity timing errors.
Both RB1 and PREV result in pessimistic results compared with high-
fidelity timing errors. RB1 overestimates DUE ratio by at least 7% in all
cases and it overestimates SDC ratio by 5.7% and 3.6% for 0.85V and 0.78V,
respectively. PREV greatly overestimates both DUE ratio and SDC ratio in
all applications.
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Figure 5.12: Injection outcome distribution for sensitivity studies of droop mag-
nitude and error groups.
5.5.3 Sensitivity Studies
Figure 5.12 shows the sensitivity studies of injection outcome distribu-
tions to droop profiles and pipeline occupancy. The first observation is that
SDC ratio increases with droop magnitude because stronger droops are more
likely to flip higher-significance bits. Second, for the same droop magnitude,
three error groups (SL, ML, and SH) lead to similar distributions (error bars
are overlapped). This also means that for single-cycle droops (SL and SH),
injection outcomes depend only on droop magnitude. Note that MH leads
to higher SDC ratio than ML because it not only affects more instructions
but also affects them multiple times. The maximum difference of SDC ratio
between MH and the other three groups is 3.5% in MG with 0.78V. Therefore,
for evaluating the impact of multi-cycle droops on applications, more accurate
modeling for pipeline occupancy is needed.
Observation 5: for single-cycle droops, injection outcomes depend only on
droop magnitude, while for multi-cycle droops, injection outcomes depend on
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both droop magnitude and pipeline occupancy.
5.6 Summary
This chapter develops high-fidelity error models for voltage droops
along with an acceleration technique called injection-point overprovisioning
which speeds up evaluation by an order of magnitude. Injection results show
that voltage droops tend to flip multiple lower-significance bits at the instruc-
tion level and rarely lead to DUEs and SDCs at the application level. It is
shown that droop duration affects injection outcomes. For single-cycle droops,
injection outcomes depend only on droop magnitude. For multi-cycle droops,
injection outcomes depend on both droop magnitude and pipeline state. The
developed high-fidelity error models for voltage droops are valuable for the
research community because existing low-fidelity models, single-bit flips and




Effectiveness of Software-Based Error
Detectors on High-Fidelity Errors1
This chapter evaluates software-based error detectors using the high-
fidelity error models introduced in previous chapters. Section 6.1 motivates
the trend of detecting errors in the software stack. Two categories of software-
based detectors are evaluated: instruction duplication at the level of the com-
piler intermediate representation (IR) (Section 6.2) and application-level error
detection (Section 6.3).
6.1 Motivation
Although hardware-based fault detection techniques such as dual mod-
ular redundancy provide high coverage for SDCs, they are costly in terms of
area and power, such that they are only adopted by mission-critical systems.
As power constraints pose challenges for future systems, researchers have been
advocating software-based alternatives to harden systems against hardware er-
rors. Software detectors are attractive because they are shown to provide high
1Part of this chapter appears in [94]. The author of this dissertation is the main con-
tributor of the idea, implementation, and evaluation. The other coauthors in [94] assist
development of the idea and implementation.
85
coverage for hardware errors and can be selectively employed to only protect
critical sections [95, 96, 58, 77, 97].
Furthermore, software-based detectors are both flexible and efficient.
In terms of flexibility, they are hardware-agnostic and can be enabled only
for target applications. In terms of efficiency, software detectors can focus on
critical parts of the applications to maximize error coverage given a fixed cost
of performance overhead.
Specifically, this research focuses on two types of software detectors:
instruction duplication and application-level error detection. The former de-
tects errors by inserting redundant instructions and checking instructions at
compile time [98, 95, 96, 97], while the latter detects errors with characteristics
at the application level [99, 100, 58, 101]. Unlike previous work that evaluates
these detectors using single-bit flips, this dissertation uses the high-fidelity
error models developed in this research.
6.2 Compiler IR-Level Instruction Duplication
Instruction duplication (Figure 6.1) is a technique that detects errors
by inserting redundant operations and checking instructions at compile time.
The naive method, known as full duplication, replicates and protects all in-
structions in the program but incurs significant performance overhead. On
the other hand, selective instruction duplication protects a subset of instruc-
tions to maximize error coverage at some reasonable performance overhead.






















Figure 6.1: An example of instruction duplication methods. (a) original dataflow
graph. (b) full instruction duplication. (c) selective instruction duplication.
vulnerable. In fact, only a small number of instructions in a program are re-
sponsible for the majority of SDCs. Hence, protecting these highly vulnerable
instructions with priority gives developers a reasonable trade-off between the
coverage and performance overhead.
6.2.1 LLVM IR-Level Instruction Duplication
Researchers have relied on compiler IR, such as LLVM IR, for resilience
studies and selective instruction duplication [13, 102, 59, 103, 104]. This is
because LLVM is platform-independent and is a well-supported open-source
tool.
Since errors originate in hardware and the IR is a high-level abstrac-
tion of a program, debates over the accuracy of IR-level injection and the
effectiveness of IR-level protection remain. Specifically, researchers have made
two assumptions when using IR for selective instruction duplication, which
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have yet to be validated: (1) IR-level injection is accurate enough to project
the vulnerability of its lower layer counterparts (i.e., the generated binary),
and (2) instruction duplication at the IR level captures high-fidelity hardware
errors. Although researchers have investigated the accuracy of IR-based fault
injection [8, 13, 105], they focused on the programs without protection and
did not use realistic errors in their evaluation.
6.2.2 Evaluation Methodology
The evaluation consists of the following parts: (1) the effectiveness
of IR-level selective instruction duplication at reducing SDCs resulting from
high-fidelity error models, (2) the effectiveness of full IR instruction duplica-
tion at mitigating SDCs, and (3) the impact of different error models on the
effectiveness of selective instruction duplication.
Implementation of selective instruction duplication: The implemen-
tation consists of four steps: (1) characterization, (2) selection, (3) duplication,
and (4) code generation. The characterization step identifies which IR instruc-
tions are responsible for SDCs. Since the instruction-level injector of Hamartia
is at the binary level (Section 3.1.4), LLFI [13], an LLVM IR-level injector, is
used instead. LLFI characterizes each IR instruction’s contribution to SDCs
using the RB1 error model.
Based on the characterization results, the selection step determines
which instructions to protect by solving a 0-1 knapsack problem, which is the
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same methodology used in [58, 97]. The output of this step is a list of IR
instructions to duplicate.
The duplication step transforms the IR by adding redundant operations
and checking instructions. The instructions provided by the selection step are
duplicated and a checker is placed right before their following branch, store,
function call, or function return.
The code generation step converts the transformed IR into a x86 binary
using LLVM’s code generation tools.
Error models: The focus here is errors due to particle strikes since instruc-
tion duplication assumes that the error affects only a single instruction.2 The
baseline is single-bit flips at the LLVM IR level, used in most prior studies on
IR-based selective instruction duplication [8, 59, 13, 104]. It is compared with
error models at the binary level in Hamartia. To summarize, the error models
include:
• Single-bit flip at the LLVM IR level (RB1-LLVM): randomly flips
a single bit in the destination register of a random dynamic LLVM IR
instruction.
• Single-bit flip at binary level (RB1-BIN): randomly flips a single
bit in the destination operand of a random dynamic instruction at the
2Recall that voltage droops are likely to affect multiple instructions including the in-
structions inserted for error detection.
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binary level.
• RTL-level model (RTL): the high-fidelity error model for particle
strikes introduced in Chapter 4.
Metric: To quantify cost-effectiveness, the effectiveness of SDC reduction is
examined as the fraction of instructions being duplicated is increased. For each
benchmark and each error model, a protection curve is derived, a graphical
representation that helps researchers trade-off resilience and performance over-
head [58, 70]. The x-axis is the protection level (i.e., the fraction of dynamic
instructions duplicated). For instance, a protection level of 50% means that at
most half of the total dynamic instructions are duplicated for protection. The
y-axis is the SDC coverage, the reduction of SDC probability after protection
divided by the SDC probability before protection. For example, if the initial
SDC probability is 20% and the resultant SDC probability is 10% for some
protection level, then the SDC coverage at the protection level is 50%.
Benchmarks: This research evaluates the serial version of programs from
common benchmark suites (including Parboil [106], Rodinia [107], Parsec [108],
and SPEC [109]), an earthquake simulation application, hercules, from
Carnegie Mellon University [110], and the molecular dynamics application,
puremd, from Purdue University [111]. Table 6.1 summarizes the benchmarks
and their inputs. All programs are compiled using LLVM 3.4 with -O2.
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Table 6.1: Benchmarks and their input.
Suite/Author Input
bfs Parboil graph4096.txt
blackscholes Parsec 1 in 4.txt
cutcp Parboil watbox.sl40.pqr
hercules Carnegie Mellon University simple case.e
hotspot Rodinia 64 64 1 1 temp 64 power 64
libquantum SPEC 33 5
nw Rodinia 2048 10 1
puremd Purdue University geo ffield control
sad Parboil reference.bin frame.bin
6.2.3 Experimental Results
The effectiveness of IR-level selective instruction duplication: Fig-
ure 6.2 shows the protection curves measured under different error models.
The ground truth is the results under the RTL error model (red triangles).
The observation is that most SDCs can be detected by duplicating a fraction
of IR instructions in a program. In most cases, protecting 20% of instructions
is able to cover more than 50% of SDCs. Note that the knee of the protection
curves (i.e., the protection level after which the protection curve plateaus out)
varies across applications. Prior work has observed similar results [58, 70, 104].
Next, consider the curves of RTL (red triangles) and RB1-LLVM
(dashed curves). In each benchmark, IR-based evaluation usually leads to
pessimistic results at low protection levels but optimistic results at high pro-
tection levels. However, both curves follow similar trends across benchmarks.
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Figure 6.2: Protection curves (x-axis: protection level; y-axis: SDC coverage).
9.32% (excluding the outlier, nw, which is explained below). These results in-
dicate that IR-based selective instruction duplication can approach reasonable
trade-offs between SDC coverage and performance overhead.
The exception is nw where the LLVM curve is consistently higher than
that of RTL. The difference is not statistically meaningful because the SDC
ratio even without any protection is already low (1.58%).
Observation 1: IR-based selective instruction duplication is able to provide
cost-effective protection to mitigate SDCs under high-fidelity errors.
The effectiveness of full duplication at mitigating SDCs: Table 6.2
shows that under RTL and RB1-BIN, there are a small number of errors that
92
Table 6.2: SDC ratios under full IR-level instruction duplication.
bfs blackscholes cutcp hercules hotspot libquantum nw puremd sad gmean
RTL 0.21% 0.10% 0.38% 0.75% 0.33% 0.05% 0.92% 0.08% 1.52% 0.28%
RB1-BIN 0.13% 0.10% 0.71% 0.25% 0.62% 0.05% 0.46% 0.08% 0.84% 0.24%
escape full duplication of IR instructions and eventually lead to SDCs. On
average, the SDC ratios of RTL and RB1-BIN are 0.28% and 0.24%, respec-
tively. Since the duplication is at the IR level, injection using RB1-LLVM
leads to zero SDC. The reason why errors injected at lower layers escape IR
instruction duplication is because the code generation step inserts additional
instructions that are not visible at the IR level (e.g., instructions that set up
or tear down stack frames). Hence, they are not protected by IR duplication.
Observation 2: Only a small fraction (0.28%) of high-fidelity errors escape
full IR instruction duplication and lead to SDCs.
The impact of error models: As shown in Figure 6.2, the protection
curves measured using RTL (red triangles) and RB1-BIN (blue solid curves)
have very similar shapes. The mean absolute difference across benchmarks is
7.11% (5.55% if nw is excluded). The exceptions are nw and blackscholes
whose SDC ratios are low (around 1%) even without any protection. Notice
that for blackscholes when protection level is at 3%, there is a 27% difference
between the two curves. This is because the SDC ratios without protection
are 1.4% and 0.9% for RB1-BIN and RTL respectively. Although they are
close in terms of absolute values, their difference is large relatively.
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Observation 3: Protection curves measured by RTL and RB1-BIN are mostly
similar (5% mean absolute difference). Hence, RB1-BIN can also be used as a
fast proxy to evaluate the effectiveness of selective instruction duplication on
high-fidelity errors.
6.3 Application-Level Error Detection
Application-level error detection refers to an approach that detects
errors using application-specific characteristics. Unlike compiler-based tech-
niques, the implementations of application-level detectors usually require mod-
ification to the source code. This section evaluates two applications with
application-level detectors: CLAMR that contains a detector that checks in-
variants in the algorithm [101], and HeatDist that can be protected by value-
prediction [112, 113].
6.3.1 CLAMR
CLAMR is a cell-based adaptive mesh refinement mini-app for hydro-
dynamic simulation [101]. The developers design an application-level detector
that takes advantage of the conservation of mass. If the mass of the water
deviates beyond an allowable difference, the program raises an exception indi-
cating an error has been detected.
Evaluation: The goal is to understand the impact of different error models

























































Figure 6.3: Injection outcome distributions of CLAMR without protection and
CLAMR with the mass-conservation detector. Error models from left to right
are high-fidelity errors due to particle strikes, single-bit flip, and four high-
fidelity error models due to voltage droops (see Section 5.4).
with the mass-conservation detector and the other without it. In addition to
single-bit flips, high-fidelity errors due to particle strikes and errors due to
voltage droops are also evaluated.
Results: Figure 6.3 shows the outcome distributions of different error mod-
els. The first observation is that the mass-conservation detector can signifi-
cantly reduce the SDCs due to particle strikes (RTL) and single-bit flips (RB1).
For RTL, the SDC ratio reduces to 3.28% from 16.36%; as for RB1, the SDC
ratio reduces to 4.86% from 20.55%. Also, RB1 leads to distributions similar
to RTL regardless of the presence of the detector.
Observation 1: The mass-conservation detector can effectively capture SDCs
due to particle strikes.
However, the effectiveness of the detector at mitigating SDCs due to
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voltage droops is limited. Voltage droops that corrupt only one instruction
(the SL models) lead to low SDC ratios whether a detector is present or not.
This is because voltage droops tend to flip the low-significance bits of the
output operand as found in Section 5.5. The mass-conservation detector is
only able to reduce the SDC ratios by about 2% for both 0.85V-SL and 0.78V-
SL. On the other hand, voltage droops that corrupt multiple instructions (the
MH models) result in higher SDC ratios. The mass-conservation detector
can reduce the SDC ratios by about 4% for both 0.85V-MH and 0.78V-MH.
The results indicate that other detectors are needed to address the impact of
voltage droops on CLAMR.
Observation 2: The effectiveness of the mass-conservation detector at cap-
turing SDCs due to voltage droops is limited, indicating the need of additional
detectors to handle voltage droops.
6.3.2 HeatDist
HeatDist computes the steady-state heat distribution with Laplace’s
equation using the Jacobi iterative method. The developers observe that in
general data of HPC applications change smoothly over time, and thus they
propose two types of prediction-based detectors. The first type predicts data
values using data from previous timestamps (temporal prediction [112]), and
the second type predicts values using neighboring data points in the data struc-
ture (spatial prediction [113]). If data deviate beyond an allowable difference










































































Figure 6.4: Injection outcome distributions of HeatDist without protection,
with the detector using temporal prediction, and with the detector using spatial
prediction. Error models from left to right are high-fidelity errors due to particle
strikes, single-bit flip, and four high-fidelity error models due to voltage droops
(see Section 5.4).
Evaluation: The goal is to understand the impact of different error models
on HeatDist. Three versions of HeatDist are evaluated: one without protec-
tion, another with a detector based on temporal prediction, and the other with
a detector based on spatial prediction. Note that both prediction-based detec-
tors incur similar performance overhead for HeatDist. In addition to single-bit
flips, high-fidelity errors due to particle strikes and errors due to voltage droops
are evaluated.
Results: Figure 6.4 shows the outcome distributions of different error models
and the detailed SDC ratios are shown in Table 6.3. Both types of detectors
can effectively reduce SDCs due to particle-strike error models. For both RTL
and RB1, the SDC ratio reduces to about 1% with either detector. However,
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the detector using spatial prediction leads to higher DUE ratios. It turns out
that 97% of errors detected as DUEs by spatial prediction are false positives.3
In contrast, the detector using temporal prediction has a low false-positive
ratio (3%). As a result, temporal prediction should be used instead since both
prediction-based detectors incur similar performance overhead for HeatDist.
Observation 1: Although both prediction-based detectors can effectively cap-
ture SDCs due to particle strikes, the detector using temporal prediction is
more favorable due to its low false-positive ratio.
As for comparison between RB1 and RTL, it is observed that, without
detection, RB1 estimates higher SDC ratios compared with RTL (16% vs.
12%). With either detector, RB1 also estimates higher DUE ratios vs. RTL
(10% vs. 5% for temporal prediction and 20% vs. 14% for spatial prediction).
For HeatDist without detectors, RTL and RB1 estimate higher SDC
ratios than the high-fidelity voltage-droop error models (12− 16% vs. 0− 4%)
because voltage droops tend to flip the low-significance bits of the output
operand. Adding either type of detector removes all SDCs caused by voltage
droops that decrease voltage to 0.85V. However, stronger droops can still cause
SDCs even with a detector.
Observation 2: Prediction-based detectors can eliminate SDCs caused by
3False positives are errors reported as DUEs by the detector but their impact on the
application is insignificant and should be classified as Masked without detection. To count
the percentage of false positives, the detector does not terminate the application upon
detection.
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Table 6.3: SDC ratios of HeatDist without protection, with the detector using
temporal prediction, and with the detector using spatial prediction.
RTL RB1 0.85V-SL 0.78V-SL 0.85-MH 0.78-MH
HeatDist original 12.60% 16.60% 0.12% 1.34% 0.34% 3.79%
HeatDist temporal 1.00% 1.00% 0.00% 0.30% 0.00% 0.61%
HeatDist spatial 1.40% 1.40% 0.00% 0.19% 0.00% 0.14%
voltage droops of lower magnitude. Other detectors are needed to handle SDCs
caused by stronger droops.
6.4 Summary
This chapter evaluates software-based detectors using high-fidelity er-
ror models. Evaluation shows that IR-based selective instruction duplica-
tion is able to cost-effectively reduce SDCs resulting from particle strikes.
Application-level detectors, on the other hand, can effectively detect errors
caused by particle strikes but not voltage droops, indicating the need of ad-
ditional detectors to handle voltage droops. Single-bit flips remain a good
approximation of particle strikes even when applications are protected by
software-based detectors studied in this research.
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Chapter 7
Summary and Concluding Remarks
To summarize, the research objectives are: (1) increasing error model-
ing fidelity, (2) reducing the number of application runs while keeping sampling
quality equal, and (3) evaluating the effects of modeling fidelity on experimen-
tal results. This dissertation presents Hamartia, an open-source hardware
error analysis suite with high fidelity and low overhead. Hamartia increases
error modeling fidelity for particle strikes and voltage droops with hierarchi-
cal injection. Two novel acceleration techniques, nested Monte Carlo and
injection-point overprovisioning, are included in Hamartia to speed up error
injection by 1 − 2 orders of magnitude while keeping sampling quality equal.
This high-fidelity and low-overhead error injection methodology discovers new
insights in terms of the impact of errors on applications, the effectiveness of
detectors, and the effects of modeling fidelity on experimental results. Key
insights from evaluation include:
• For estimating injection outcome distributions, single-bit flips are a good
approximation of particle strikes.
• For estimating application output quality, high-fidelity error models are
required.
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• Existing low-fidelity error models (single-bit flips and previous values)
do not represent errors caused by voltage droops.
• Software-based detectors can effectively detect errors caused by particle
strikes but not voltage droops, indicating the need of additional detectors
for handling voltage droops.
7.1 Broad Applicability
Although this research focuses on applications in the high-performance
computing (HPC) domain, Hamartia opens a new chapter of resilience studies
in other domains as well. For instance, hardware errors pose reliability and
availability problems for data centers due to their massive scale [114, 115, 116].
Another applicable domain is automotive systems where multiple electronic
control units are expected to be consolidated into a single unit for lower costs.
The usage of advanced manufacturing technologies implies that systems would
be more sensitive to transient errors. As a result, the design ought to handle
hardware problems to guarantee functional safety [117, 118].
7.2 Hardware Errors Beyond This Research
As this research focuses on arithmetic errors, there exist hardware errors
not modeled in the current implementation of Hamartia. However, some can
be addressed by extending Hamartia, and the acceleration techniques proposed
in this dissertation are equally useful for evaluating other error types.
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Memory errors: These include errors in register files, caches, various buffers
at the micro-architectural level, and errors in DRAM. Although memory struc-
tures are usually protected by parity or ECC, some errors can still escape
detection and impact applications. In addition to memory array structures,
the peripheral circuits are also vulnerable. Errors from emerging non-volatile
memory should also be studied as well.
Uncore errors: These include errors in the cache controllers, interconnection
networks, memory controllers, and I/O controllers. Addressing these errors is
important as the uncore part of modern CPUs occupies a significant portion of
die area. Prior work studies the impact of particle strikes on the uncore of the
OpenSPARC T2 processor and designs hardware-based techniques to recover
failures in the cache controllers [119]. Resilient cache coherence protocols are
also proposed to address transient errors [120].
Hamartia can be extended to evaluate the impact of various errors on
applications, the effectiveness of detectors, and the effects of modeling fidelity
on experimental results. Some errors (e.g., DRAM errors) can be evaluated by
implementing new instruction-level error models in Hamartia, while some (e.g.,
errors in micro-architectural components) require a new interface in addition
to the original error context API. To address error masking, both nested Monte
Carlo and injection-point overprovisioning can be applied to reduce the number
of application runs while keeping sampling quality equal.
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